Saturday, December 27, 2008

Great Myths of the Great Depression

Posted By admin On December 21, 2008 @ 3:27 pm In Articles, Books, Featured, Library | No Comments

Introduction

Many volumes have been written about the Great Depression of 1929-1941 and its impact on the lives of millions of Americans. Historians, economists and politicians have all combed the wreckage searching for the “black box” that will reveal the cause of the calamity. Sadly, all too many of them decide to abandon their search, finding it easier perhaps to circulate a host of false and harmful conclusions about the events of seven decades ago. Consequently, many people today continue to accept critiques of free-market capitalism that are unjustified and support government policies that are economically destructive.

How bad was the Great Depression? Over the four years from 1929 to 1933, production at the nation’s factories, mines and utilities fell by more than half. People’s real disposable incomes dropped 28 percent. Stock prices collapsed to one-tenth of their pre-crash height. The number of unemployed Americans rose from 1.6 million in 1929 to 12.8 million in 1933. One of every four workers was out of a job at the Depression’s nadir, and ugly rumors of revolt simmered for the first time since the Civil War.

“The terror of the Great Crash has been the failure to explain it,” writes economist Alan Reynolds. “People were left with the feeling that massive economic contractions could occur at any moment, without warning, without cause. That fear has been exploited ever since as the major justification for virtually unlimited federal intervention in economic affairs.”[1]

Old myths never die; they just keep showing up in economics and political science textbooks. With only an occasional exception, it is there you will find what may be the 20th century’s greatest myth: Capitalism and the free-market economy were responsible for the Great Depression, and only government intervention brought about America’s economic recovery.

A Modern Fairy Tale

According to this simplistic perspective, an important pillar of capitalism, the stock market, crashed and dragged America into depression. President Herbert Hoover, an advocate of “hands-off,” or laissez-faire, economic policy, refused to use the power of government and conditions worsened as a result. It was up to Hoover’s successor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, to ride in on the white horse of government intervention and steer the nation toward recovery. The apparent lesson to be drawn is that capitalism cannot be trusted; government needs to take an active role in the economy to save us from inevitable decline.

But those who propagate this version of history might just as well top off their remarks by saying, “And Goldilocks found her way out of the forest, Dorothy made it from Oz back to Kansas, and Little Red Riding Hood won the New York State Lottery.” The popular account of the Depression as outlined above belongs in a book of fairy tales and not in a serious discussion of economic history.

The Great, Great,Great,Great Depression

To properly understand the events of the time, it is factually appropriate to view the Great Depression as not one, but four consecutive downturns rolled into one. These four “phases” are:2

I. Monetary Policy and the Business Cycle

II. The Disintegration of the World Economy

III. The New Deal

IV. The Wagner Act

The first phase covers why the crash of 1929 happened in the first place; the other three show how government intervention worsened it and kept the economy in a stupor for over a decade. Let’s consider each one in turn.

Phase I: The Business Cycle

The Great Depression was not the country’s first depression, though it proved to be the longest. Several others preceded it.

A common thread woven through all of those earlier debacles was disastrous intervention by government, often in the form of political mismanagement of the money and credit supply. None of these depressions, however, lasted more than four years and most of them were over in two. The calamity that began in 1929 lasted at least three times longer than any of the country’s previous depressions because the government compounded its initial errors with a series of additional and harmful interventions.

Central Planners Fail at Monetary Policy

A popular explanation for the stock market collapse of 1929 concerns the practice of borrowing money to buy stock. Many history texts blithely assert that a frenzied speculation in shares was fed by excessive “margin lending.” But Marquette University economist Gene Smiley, in his 2002 book “Rethinking the Great Depression”, explains why this is not a fruitful observation:

There was already a long history of margin lending on stock exchanges, and margin requirements — the share of the purchase price paid in cash — were no lower in the late twenties than in the early twenties or in previous decades. In fact, in the fall of 1928 margin requirements began to rise, and borrowers were required to pay a larger share of the purchase price of the stocks.

The margin lending argument doesn’t hold much water. Mischief with the money and credit supply, however, is another story.

Most monetary economists, particularly those of the “Austrian School,” have observed the close relationship between money supply and economic activity. When government inflates the money and credit supply, interest rates at first fall. Businesses invest this “easy money” in new production projects and a boom takes place in capital goods. As the boom matures, business costs rise, interest rates readjust upward, and profits are squeezed. The easy-money effects thus wear off and the monetary authorities, fearing price inflation, slow the growth of, or even contract, the money supply. In either case, the manipulation is enough to knock out the shaky supports from underneath the economic house of cards.

One prominent interpretation of the Federal Reserve System’s actions prior to 1929 can be found in “America’s Great Depression” by economist Murray Rothbard. Using a broad measure that includes currency, demand and time deposits, and other ingredients, he estimated that the Fed bloated the money supply by more than 60 percent from mid-1921 to mid-1929.3 Rothbard argued that this expansion of money and credit drove interest rates down, pushed the stock market to dizzy heights, and gave birth to the “Roaring Twenties.”

Reckless money and credit growth constituted what economist Benjamin M. Anderson called “the beginning of the New Deal”4 — the name for the better-known but highly interventionist policies that would come later under President Franklin Roosevelt. However, other scholars raise doubts that Fed action was as inflationary as Rothbard believed, pointing to relatively flat commodity and consumer prices in the 1920s as evidence that monetary policy was not so wildly irresponsible.

Substantial cuts in high marginal income tax rates in the Coolidge years certainly helped the economy and may have ameliorated the price effect of Fed policy. Tax reductions spurred investment and real economic growth, which in turn yielded a burst of technological advancement and entrepreneurial discoveries of cheaper ways to produce goods. This explosion in productivity undoubtedly helped to keep prices lower than they would have otherwise been.

Regarding Fed policy, free-market economists who differ on the extent of the Fed’s monetary expansion of the early and mid-1920s are of one view about what happened next: The central bank presided over a dramatic contraction of the money supply that began late in the decade. The federal government’s responses to the resulting recession took a bad situation and made it far, far worse.

The Bottom Drops Out

By 1928, the Federal Reserve was raising interest rates and choking off the money supply. For example, its discount rate (the rate the Fed charges member banks for loans) was increased four times, from 3.5 percent to 6 percent, between January 1928 and August 1929. The central bank took further deflationary action by aggressively selling government securities for months after the stock market crashed. For the next three years, the money supply shrank by 30 percent. As prices then tumbled throughout the economy, the Fed’s higher interest rate policy boosted real (inflation-adjusted) rates dramatically.

The most comprehensive chronicle of the monetary policies of the period can be found in the classic work of Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman and his colleague Anna Schwartz,

“A Monetary History of the United States”, 1867-1960. Friedman and Schwartz argue conclusively that the contraction of the nation’s money supply by one-third between August 1929 and March 1933 was an enormous drag on the economy and largely the result of seismic incompetence by the Fed. The death in October 1928 of Benjamin Strong, a powerful figure who had exerted great influence as head of the Fed’s New York district bank, left the Fed floundering without capable leadership — making bad policy even worse.5

At first, only the “smart” money — the Bernard Baruchs and the Joseph Kennedys who watched things like money supply and other government policies — saw that the party was coming to an end. Baruch actually began selling stocks and buying bonds and gold as early as 1928; Kennedy did likewise, commenting, “only a fool holds out for the top dollar.”6

The masses of investors eventually sensed the change at the Fed and then the stampede began. In a special issue commemorating the 50th anniversary of the stock market collapse, U.S. News & World Report described it this way:

Actually the Great Crash was by no means a one-day affair, despite frequent references to Black Thursday, October 24, and the following week’s Black Tuesday. As early as September 5, stocks were weak in heavy trading, after having moved into new high ground two days earlier. Declines in early October were called a “desirable correction.” The Wall Street Journal, predicting an autumn rally, noted that “some stocks rise, some fall.”

Then, on October 3, stocks suffered their worst pummeling of the year. Margin calls went out; some traders grew apprehensive. But the next day, prices rose again and thereafter seesawed for a fortnight.

The real crunch began on Wednesday, October 23, with what one observer called “a Niagara of liquidation.” Six million shares changed hands. The industrial average fell 21 points. “Tomorrow, the turn will come,” brokers told one another. Prices, they said, had been carried to “unreasonably low” levels.

But the next day, Black Thursday, stocks were dumped in even heavier selling … the ticker fell behind more than 5 hours, and finally stopped grinding out quotations at 7:08 p.m.7

At their peak, stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average were selling for 19 times earnings — somewhat high, but hardly what stock market analysts regard as a sign of inordinate speculation. The distortions in the economy promoted by the Fed’s monetary policy had set the country up for a recession, but other impositions to come would soon turn the recession into a full-scale disaster. As stocks took a beating, Congress was playing with fire: On the very morning of Black Thursday, the nation’s newspapers reported that the political forces for higher trade-damaging tariffs were making gains on Capitol Hill.

The stock market crash was only a reflection — not the direct cause — of the destructive government policies that would ultimately produce the Great Depression: The market rose and fell in almost direct synchronization with what the Fed and Congress were doing. And what they did in the 1930s ranks way up there in the annals of history’s greatest follies.

Buddy, Can You Spare $20 Million?

Black Thursday shook Michigan harder than almost any other state. Stocks of auto and mining companies were hammered. Auto production in 1929 reached an all-time high of slightly more than 5 million vehicles, then quickly slumped by 2 million in 1930. By 1932, near the deepest point of the Depression, they had fallen by another 2 million to just 1,331,860 — down an astonishing 75 percent from the 1929 peak.

Thousands of investors everywhere, including many well-known people, were hit hard in the 1929 crash. Among them was Winston Churchill. He had invested heavily in American stocks before the crash. Afterward, only his writing skills and positions in government restored his finances.

Clarence Birdseye, an early developer of packaged frozen foods, had sold his business for $30 million and put all his money into stocks. He was wiped out.

William C. Durant, founder of General Motors, lost more than $40 million in the stock market and wound up a virtual pauper. (GM itself stayed in the black throughout the Depression under the cost-cutting leadership of Alfred P. Sloan.)

Phase II: Disintegration of the World Economy

Though modern myth claims that the free market “self-destructed” in 1929, government policy was the debacle’s principal culprit. If this crash had been like previous ones, the hard times would have ended in two or three years at the most, and likely sooner than that. But unprecedented political bungling instead prolonged the misery for over 10 years.

Unemployment in 1930 averaged a mildly recessionary 8.9 percent, up from 3.2 percent in 1929. It shot up rapidly until peaking out at more than 25 percent in 1933. Until March of 1933, these were the years of President Herbert Hoover — a man often depicted as a champion of noninterventionist, laissez-faire economics.

“The greatest spending administration in all of history”

Did Hoover really subscribe to a “hands-off-the-economy,” free-market philosophy? His opponent in the 1932 election, Franklin Roosevelt, didn’t think so. During the campaign, Roosevelt blasted Hoover for spending and taxing too much, boosting the national debt, choking off trade, and putting millions on the dole. He accused the president of “reckless and extravagant” spending, of thinking “that we ought to center control of everything in Washington as rapidly as possible,” and of presiding over “the greatest spending administration in peacetime in all of history.” Roosevelt’s running mate, John Nance Garner, charged that Hoover was “leading the country down the path of socialism.”8 Contrary to the conventional view about Hoover, Roosevelt and Garner were absolutely right.

The crowning folly of the Hoover administration was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, passed in June 1930. It came on top of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922, which had already put American agriculture in a tailspin during the preceding decade. The most protectionist legislation in U.S. history, Smoot-Hawley virtually closed the borders to foreign goods and ignited a vicious international trade war. Professor Barry Poulson describes the scope of the act:

The act raised the rates on the entire range of dutiable commodities; for example, the average rate increased from 20 percent to 34 percent on agricultural products; from 36 percent to 47 percent on wines, spirits, and beverages; from 50 to 60 percent on wool and woolen manufactures. In all, 887 tariffs were sharply increased and the act broadened the list of dutiable commodities to 3,218 items. A crucial part of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff was that many tariffs were for a specific amount of money rather than a percentage of the price. As prices fell by half or more during the Great Depression, the effective rate of these specific tariffs doubled, increasing the protection afforded under the act.9

Smoot-Hawley was as broad as it was deep, affecting a multitude of products. Before its passage, clocks had faced a tariff of 45 percent; the act raised that to 55 percent, plus as much as another $4.50 per clock. Tariffs on corn and butter were roughly doubled. Even sauerkraut was tariffed for the first time. Among the few remaining tariff-free goods, strangely enough, were leeches and skeletons (perhaps as a political sop to the American Medical Association, as one wag wryly remarked).

Tariffs on linseed oil, tungsten, and casein hammered the U.S. paint, steel and paper industries, respectively. More than 800 items used in automobile production were taxed by Smoot-Hawley. Most of the 60,000 people employed in U.S. plants making cheap clothing out of imported wool rags went home jobless after the tariff on wool rags rose by 140 percent.10

Officials in the administration and in Congress believed that raising trade barriers would force Americans to buy more goods made at home, which would solve the nagging unemployment problem. But they ignored an important principle of international commerce: Trade is ultimately a two-way street; if foreigners cannot sell their goods here, then they cannot earn the dollars they need to buy here. Or, to put it another way, government cannot shut off imports without simultaneously shutting off exports.

You Tax Me, I Tax You

Foreign companies and their workers were flattened by Smoot-Hawley’s steep tariff rates and foreign governments soon retaliated with trade barriers of their own. With their ability to sell in the American market severely hampered, they curtailed their purchases of American goods. American agriculture was particularly hard hit. With a stroke of the presidential pen, farmers in this country lost nearly a third of their markets. Farm prices plummeted and tens of thousands of farmers went bankrupt. A bushel of wheat that sold for $1 in 1929 was selling for a mere 30 cents by 1932.

With the collapse of agriculture, rural banks failed in record numbers, dragging down hundreds of thousands of their customers. Nine thousand banks closed their doors in the United States between 1930 and 1933. The stock market, which had regained much of the ground it had lost since the previous October, tumbled 20 points on the day Hoover signed Smoot-Hawley into law, and fell almost without respite for the next two years. (The market’s high, as measured by the Dow Jones Industrial Average, was set on Sept. 3, 1929, at 381. It hit its 1929 low of 198 on Nov. 13, then rebounded to 294 by April 1930. It declined again as the tariff bill made its way toward Hoover’s desk in June and did not bottom out until it reached a mere 41 two years later. It would be a quarter-century before the Dow would climb to 381 again.)

The shrinkage in world trade brought on by the tariff wars helped set the stage for World War?II a few years later. In 1929, the rest of the world owed American citizens $30 billion. Germany’s Weimar Republic was struggling to pay the enormous reparations bill imposed by the disastrous Treaty of Versailles. When tariffs made it nearly impossible for foreign businessmen to sell their goods in American markets, the burden of their debts became massively heavier and emboldened demagogues like Adolf Hitler. “When goods don’t cross frontiers, armies will,” warns an old but painfully true maxim.

Free Markets or Free Lunches?

Smoot-Hawley by itself should lay to rest the myth that Hoover was a free market practitioner, but there is even more to the story of his administration’s interventionist mistakes. Within a month of the stock market crash, he convened conferences of business leaders for the purpose of jawboning them into keeping wages artificially high even though both profits and prices were falling. Consumer prices plunged almost 25 percent between 1929 and 1933 while nominal wages on average decreased only 15 percent — translating into a substantial increase in wages in real terms, a major component of the cost of doing business. As economist Richard Ebeling notes, “The ‘high-wage’ policy of the Hoover administration and the trade unions … succeeded only in pricing workers out of the labor market, generating an increasing circle of unemployment.”11

Hoover dramatically increased government spending for subsidy and relief schemes. In the space of one year alone, from 1930 to 1931, the federal government’s share of GNP soared from 16.4 percent to 21.5 percent.12 Hoover’s agricultural bureaucracy doled out hundreds of millions of dollars to wheat and cotton farmers even as the new tariffs wiped out their markets. His Reconstruction Finance Corporation ladled out billions more in business subsidies. Commenting decades later on Hoover’s administration, Rexford Guy Tugwell, one of the architects of Franklin Roosevelt’s policies of the 1930s, explained, “We didn’t admit it at the time, but practically the whole New Deal was extrapolated from programs that Hoover started.”13

Though Hoover at first did lower taxes for the poorest of Americans, Larry Schweikart and Michael Allen in their sweeping “A Patriot’s History of the United States: From Columbus’s Great Discovery to the War on Terror” stress that he “offered no incentives to the wealthy to invest in new plants to stimulate hiring.” He even taxed bank checks, “which accelerated the decline in the availability of money by penalizing people for writing checks.”14

In September 1931, with the money supply tumbling and the economy reeling from the impact of Smoot-Hawley, the Fed imposed the biggest hike in its discount rate in history. Bank deposits fell 15 percent within four months and sizable, deflationary declines in the nation’s money supply persisted through the first half of 1932.

Compounding the error of high tariffs, huge subsidies and deflationary monetary policy, Congress then passed and Hoover signed the Revenue Act of 1932. The largest tax increase in peacetime history, it doubled the income tax. The top bracket actually more than doubled, soaring from 24 percent to 63 percent. Exemptions were lowered; the earned income credit was abolished; corporate and estate taxes were raised; new gift, gasoline and auto taxes were imposed; and postal rates were sharply hiked.

Can any serious scholar observe the Hoover administration’s massive economic intervention and, with a straight face, pronounce the inevitably deleterious effects as the fault of free markets? Schweikart and Allen survey some of the wreckage:

By 1933, the numbers produced by this comedy of errors were staggering: national unemployment rates reached 25 percent, but within some individual cities, the statistics seemed beyond comprehension. Cleveland reported that 50 percent of its labor force was unemployed; Toledo, 80 percent; and some states even averaged over 40 percent. Because of the dual-edged sword of declining revenues and increasing welfare demands, the burden on the cities pushed many municipalities to the brink. Schools in New York shut down, and teachers in Chicago were owed some $20 million. Private schools, in many cases, failed completely. One government study found that by 1933 some fifteen hundred colleges had gone belly-up, and book sales plummeted. Chicago’s library system did not purchase a single book in a year-long period.15

Phase III: The New Deal

Franklin Delano Roosevelt won the 1932 presidential election in a landslide, collecting 472 electoral votes to just 59 for the incumbent Herbert Hoover. The platform of the Democratic Party, whose ticket Roosevelt headed, declared, “We believe that a party platform is a covenant with the people to be faithfully kept by the party entrusted with power.” It called for a 25 percent reduction in federal spending, a balanced federal budget, a sound gold currency “to be preserved at all hazards,” the removal of government from areas that belonged more appropriately to private enterprise and an end to the “extravagance” of Hoover’s farm programs. This is what candidate Roosevelt promised, but it bears no resemblance to what President Roosevelt actually delivered.

Washington was rife with both fear and optimism as Roosevelt was sworn in on March 4, 1933 — fear that the economy might not recover and optimism that the new and assertive president just might make a difference. Humorist Will Rogers captured the popular feeling toward FDR as he assembled the new administration: “The whole country is with him, just so he does something. If he burned down the Capitol, we would all cheer and say, well, we at least got a fire started anyhow.”16

“Nothing to fear but fear itself”

Roosevelt did indeed make a difference, though probably not the sort of difference for which the country had hoped. He started off on the wrong foot when, in his inaugural address, he blamed the Depression on “unscrupulous money changers.” He said nothing about the role of the Fed’s mismanagement and little about the follies of Congress that had contributed to the problem. As a result of his efforts, the economy would linger in depression for the rest of the decade. Adapting a phrase from 19th century writer Henry David Thoreau, Roosevelt famously declared in his address that, “We have nothing to fear but fear itself.” But as Dr. Hans Sennholz of Grove City College explains, it was FDR’s policies to come that Americans had genuine reason to fear:

In his first 100 days, he swung hard at the profit order. Instead of clearing away the prosperity barriers erected by his predecessor, he built new ones of his own. He struck in every known way at the integrity of the U.S. dollar through quantitative increases and qualitative deterioration. He seized the people’s gold holdings and subsequently devalued the dollar by 40 percent.17

Frustrated and angered that Roosevelt had so quickly and thoroughly abandoned the platform on which he was elected, Director of the Bureau of the Budget Lewis W. Douglas resigned after only one year on the job. At Harvard University in May 1935, Douglas made it plain that America was facing a momentous choice:

Will we choose to subject ourselves — this great country — to the despotism of bureaucracy, controlling our every act, destroying what equality we have attained, reducing us eventually to the condition of impoverished slaves of the state? Or will we cling to the liberties for which man has struggled for more than a thousand years? It is important to understand the magnitude of the issue before us. … If we do not elect to have a tyrannical, oppressive bureaucracy controlling our lives, destroying progress, depressing the standard of living … then should it not be the function of the Federal government under a democracy to limit its activities to those which a democracy may adequately deal, such for example as national defense, maintaining law and order, protecting life and property, preventing dishonesty, and … guarding the public against … vested special interests?18

New Dealing from the Bottom of the Deck

Crisis gripped the banking system when the new president assumed office on March 4, 1933. Roosevelt’s action to close the banks and declare a nationwide “banking holiday” on March 6 (which did not completely end until nine days later) is still hailed as a decisive and necessary action by Roosevelt apologists. Friedman and Schwartz, however, make it plain that this supposed cure was “worse than the disease.” The Smoot-Hawley tariff and the Fed’s unconscionable monetary mischief were primary culprits in producing the conditions that gave Roosevelt his excuse to temporarily deprive depositors of their money, and the bank holiday did nothing to alter those fundamentals. “More than 5,000 banks still in operation when the holiday was declared did not reopen their doors when it ended, and of these, over 2,000 never did thereafter,” report Friedman and Schwartz.19

Economist Jim Powell of the Cato Institute authored a splendid book on the Great Depression in 2003, titled “FDR’s Folly: How Roosevelt and His New Deal Prolonged the Great Depression”. He points out that “Almost all the failed banks were in states with unit banking laws” — laws that prohibited banks from opening branches and thereby diversifying their portfolios and reducing their risks. Powell writes: “Although the United States, with its unit banking laws, had thousands of bank failures, Canada, which permitted branch banking, didn’t have a single failure …”20 Strangely, critics of capitalism who love to blame the market for the Depression never mention that fact.

Congress gave the president the power first to seize the private gold holdings of American citizens and then to fix the price of gold. One morning, as Roosevelt ate eggs in bed, he and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau decided to change the ratio between gold and paper dollars. After weighing his options, Roosevelt settled on a 21 cent price hike because “it’s a lucky number.” In his diary, Morgenthau wrote, “If anybody ever knew how we really set the gold price through a combination of lucky numbers, I think they would be frightened.”21 Roosevelt also single-handedly torpedoed the London Economic Conference in 1933, which was convened at the request of other major nations to bring down tariff rates and restore the gold standard.

Washington and its reckless central bank had already made mincemeat of the gold standard by the early 1930s. Roosevelt’s rejection of it removed most of the remaining impediments to limitless currency and credit expansion, for which the nation would pay a high price in later years in the form of a depreciating currency. Sen. Carter Glass put it well when he warned Roosevelt in early 1933: “It’s dishonor, sir. This great government, strong in gold, is breaking its promises to pay gold to widows and orphans to whom it has sold government bonds with a pledge to pay gold coin of the present standard of value. It is breaking its promise to redeem its paper money in gold coin of the present standard of value. It’s dishonor, sir.”22

Though he seized the country’s gold, Roosevelt did return booze to America’s bars and parlor rooms. On his second Sunday in the White House, he remarked at dinner, “I think this would be a good time for beer.”23 That same night, he drafted a message asking Congress to end Prohibition. The House approved a repeal measure on Tuesday, the Senate passed it on Thursday and before the year was out, enough states had ratified it so that the 21st Amendment became part of the Constitution. One observer, commenting on this remarkable turn of events, noted that of two men walking down the street at the start of 1933 — one with a gold coin in his pocket and the other with a bottle of whiskey in his coat — the man with the coin would be an upstanding citizen and the man with the whiskey would be the outlaw. A year later, precisely the reverse was true.

In the first year of the New Deal, Roosevelt proposed spending $10 billion while revenues were only $3 billion. Between 1933 and 1936, government expenditures rose by more than 83 percent. Federal debt skyrocketed by 73 percent.

FDR talked Congress into creating Social Security in 1935 and imposing the nation’s first comprehensive minimum wage law in 1938. While to this day he gets a great deal of credit for these two measures from the general public, many economists have a different perspective. The minimum wage law prices many of the inexperienced, the young, the unskilled and the disadvantaged out of the labor market. (For example, the minimum wage provisions passed as part of another act in 1933 threw an estimated 500,000 blacks out of work).24 And current studies and estimates reveal that Social Security has become such a long-term actuarial nightmare that it will either have to be privatized or the already high taxes needed to keep it afloat will have to be raised to the stratosphere.

Roosevelt secured passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which levied a new tax on agricultural processors and used the revenue to supervise the wholesale destruction of valuable crops and cattle. Federal agents oversaw the ugly spectacle of perfectly good fields of cotton, wheat and corn being plowed under (the mules had to be convinced to trample the crops; they had been trained, of course, to walk between the rows). Healthy cattle, sheep and pigs were slaughtered and buried in mass graves. Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace personally gave the order to slaughter 6 million baby pigs before they grew to full size. The administration also paid farmers for the first time for not working at all. Even if the AAA had helped farmers by curtailing supplies and raising prices, it could have done so only by hurting millions of others who had to pay those prices or make do with less to eat.

Blue Eagles, Red Ducks

Perhaps the most radical aspect of the New Deal was the National Industrial Recovery Act, passed in June 1933, which created a massive new bureaucracy called the National Recovery Administration. Under the NRA, most manufacturing industries were suddenly forced into government-mandated cartels. Codes that regulated prices and terms of sale briefly transformed much of the American economy into a fascist-style arrangement, while the NRA was financed by new taxes on the very industries it controlled. Some economists have estimated that the NRA boosted the cost of doing business by an average of 40 percent — not something a depressed economy needed for recovery.

The economic impact of the NRA was immediate and powerful. In the five months leading up to the act’s passage, signs of recovery were evident: factory employment and payrolls had increased by 23 and 35 percent, respectively. Then came the NRA, shortening hours of work, raising wages arbitrarily and imposing other new costs on enterprise. In the six months after the law took effect, industrial production dropped 25 percent. Benjamin M. Anderson writes, “NRA was not a revival measure. It was an antirevival measure. … Through the whole of the NRA period industrial production did not rise as high as it had been in July 1933, before NRA came in.”25

The man Roosevelt picked to direct the NRA effort was General Hugh “Iron Pants” Johnson, a profane, red-faced bully and professed admirer of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. Thundered Johnson, “May Almighty God have mercy on anyone who attempts to interfere with the Blue Eagle” (the official symbol of the NRA, which one senator derisively referred to as the “Soviet duck”). Those who refused to comply with the NRA Johnson personally threatened with public boycotts and “a punch in the nose.”

There were ultimately more than 500 NRA codes, “ranging from the production of lightning rods to the manufacture of corsets and brassieres, covering more than 2 million employers and 22 million workers.”26 There were codes for the production of hair tonic, dog leashes, and even musical comedies. A New Jersey tailor named Jack Magid was arrested and sent to jail for the “crime” of pressing a suit of clothes for 35 cents rather than the NRA-inspired “Tailor’s Code” of 40 cents.

In “The Roosevelt Myth”, historian John T. Flynn described how the NRA’s partisans sometimes conducted “business”:

The NRA was discovering it could not enforce its rules. Black markets grew up. Only the most violent police methods could procure enforcement. In Sidney Hillman’s garment industry the code authority employed enforcement police. They roamed through the garment district like storm troopers. They could enter a man’s factory, send him out, line up his employees, subject them to minute interrogation, take over his books on the instant. Night work was forbidden. Flying squadrons of these private coat-and-suit police went through the district at night, battering down doors with axes looking for men who were committing the crime of sewing together a pair of pants at night. But without these harsh methods many code authorities said there could be no compliance because the public was not back of it.27

The Alphabet Commissars

Roosevelt next signed into law steep income tax increases on the higher brackets and introduced a 5 percent withholding tax on corporate dividends. He secured another tax increase in 1934. In fact, tax hikes became a favorite policy of Roosevelt for the next 10 years, culminating in a top income tax rate of 90 percent. Sen. Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, who opposed much of the New Deal, lambasted Roosevelt’s massive tax increases. A sound economy would not be restored, he said, by following the socialist notion that America could “lift the lower one-third up” by pulling “the upper two-thirds down.”28 Vandenberg also condemned “the congressional surrender to alphabet commissars who deeply believe the American people need to be regimented by powerful overlords in order to be saved.”29

Alphabet commissars spent the public’s money like it was so much bilge. They were what influential journalist and social critic Albert Jay Nock had in mind when he described the New Deal as “a nation-wide, State-managed mobilization of inane buffoonery and aimless commotion.”30

Roosevelt’s Civil Works Administration hired actors to give free shows and librarians to catalog archives. It even paid researchers to study the history of the safety pin, hired 100 Washington workers to patrol the streets with balloons to frighten starlings away from public buildings, and put men on the public payroll to chase tumbleweeds on windy days.

The CWA, when it was started in the fall of 1933, was supposed to be a short-lived jobs program. Roosevelt assured Congress in his State of the Union message that any new such program would be abolished within a year. “The federal government,” said the president, “must and shall quit this business of relief. I am not willing that the vitality of our people be further stopped by the giving of cash, of market baskets, of a few bits of weekly work cutting grass, raking leaves, or picking up papers in the public parks.” Harry Hopkins was put in charge of the agency and later said, “I’ve got four million at work but for God’s sake, don’t ask me what they are doing.” The CWA came to an end within a few months but was replaced with another temporary relief program that evolved into the Works Progress Administration, or WPA, by 1935. It is known today as the very government program that gave rise to the new term, “boondoggle,” because it “produced” a lot more than the 77,000 bridges and 116,000 buildings to which its advocates loved to point as evidence of its efficacy.31

With good reason, critics often referred to the WPA as “We Piddle Around.” In Kentucky, WPA workers catalogued 350 different ways to cook spinach. The agency employed 6,000 “actors” though the nation’s actors’ union claimed only 4,500 members. Hundreds of WPA workers were used to collect campaign contributions for Democratic Party candidates. In Tennessee, WPA workers were fired if they refused to donate 2 percent of their wages to the incumbent governor. By 1941, only 59 percent of the WPA budget went to paying workers anything at all; the rest was sucked up in administration and overhead. The editors of The New Republic asked, “Has [Roosevelt] the moral stature to admit now that the WPA was a hasty and grandiose political gesture, that it is a wretched failure and should be abolished?”32 The last of the WPA’s projects was not eliminated until July of 1943.

Roosevelt has been lauded for his “job-creating” acts such as the CWA and the WPA. Many people think that they helped relieve the Depression. What they fail to realize is that it was the rest of Roosevelt’s tinkering that prolonged the Depression and which largely prevented the jobless from finding real jobs in the first place. The stupefying roster of wasteful spending generated by these jobs programs represented a diversion of valuable resources to politically motivated and economically counterproductive purposes.

A brief analogy will illustrate this point. If a thief goes house to house robbing everybody in the neighborhood, then heads off to a nearby shopping mall to spend his ill-gotten loot, it is not assumed that because his spending “stimulated” the stores at the mall he has thereby performed a national service or provided a general economic benefit. Likewise, when the government hires someone to catalog the many ways of cooking spinach, his tax-supported paycheck cannot be counted as a net increase to the economy because the wealth used to pay him was simply diverted, not created. Economists today must still battle this “magical thinking” every time more government spending is proposed — as if money comes not from productive citizens, but rather from the tooth fairy.

“An astonishing rabble of impudent nobodies”

Roosevelt’s haphazard economic interventions garnered credit from people who put high value on the appearance of being in charge and “doing something.” Meanwhile, the great majority of Americans were patient. They wanted very much to give this charismatic polio victim and former New York governor the benefit of the doubt. But Roosevelt always had his critics, and they would grow more numerous as the years groaned on. One of them was the inimitable “Sage of Baltimore,” H. L. Mencken, who rhetorically threw everything but the kitchen sink at the president. Paul Johnson sums up Mencken’s stinging but often-humorous barbs this way:

Mencken excelled himself in attacking the triumphant FDR, whose whiff of fraudulent collectivism filled him with genuine disgust. He was the ‘Fuhrer,’ the ‘Quack,’ surrounded by ‘an astonishing rabble of impudent nobodies,’ ‘a gang of half-educated pedagogues, nonconstitutional lawyers, starry-eyed uplifters and other such sorry wizards.’ His New Deal was a ‘political racket,’ a ‘series of stupendous bogus miracles,’ with its ‘constant appeals to class envy and hatred,’ treating government as ‘a milch-cow with 125 million teats’ and marked by ‘frequent repudiations of categorical pledges.’33

Signs of Life

The American economy was soon relieved of the burden of some of the New Deal’s worst excesses when the Supreme Court outlawed the NRA in 1935 and the AAA in 1936, earning Roosevelt’s eternal wrath and derision. Recognizing much of what Roosevelt did as unconstitutional, the “nine old men” of the Court also threw out other, more minor acts and programs which hindered recovery.

Freed from the worst of the New Deal, the economy showed some signs of life. Unemployment dropped to 18 percent in 1935, 14 percent in 1936, and even lower in 1937. But by 1938, it was back up to nearly 20 percent as the economy slumped again. The stock market crashed nearly 50 percent between August 1937 and March 1938. The “economic stimulus” of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal had achieved a real “first”: a depression within a depression!

Phase IV:

The Wagner Act

The stage was set for the 1937-38 collapse with the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 — better known as the “Wagner Act” and organized labor’s “Magna Carta.” To quote Sennholz again:

This law revolutionized American labor relations. It took labor disputes out of the courts of law and brought them under a newly created Federal agency, the National Labor Relations Board, which became prosecutor, judge, and jury, all in one. Labor union sympathizers on the Board further perverted this law, which already afforded legal immunities and privileges to labor unions. The U.S. thereby abandoned a great achievement of Western civilization, equality under the law.

The Wagner Act, or National Labor Relations Act, was passed in reaction to the Supreme Court’s voidance of NRA and its labor codes. It aimed at crushing all employer resistance to labor unions. Anything an employer might do in self-defense became an “unfair labor practice” punishable by the Board. The law not only obliged employers to deal and bargain with the unions designated as the employees’ representative; later Board decisions also made it unlawful to resist the demands of labor union leaders.34

Armed with these sweeping new powers, labor unions went on a militant organizing frenzy. Threats, boycotts, strikes, seizures of plants and widespread violence pushed productivity down sharply and unemployment up dramatically. Membership in the nation’s labor unions soared: By 1941, there were two and a half times as many Americans in unions as had been the case in 1935. Historian William E. Leuchtenburg, himself no friend of free enterprise, observed, “Property-minded citizens were scared by the seizure of factories, incensed when strikers interfered with the mails, vexed by the intimidation of nonunionists, and alarmed by flying squadrons of workers who marched, or threatened to march, from city to city.”35

An Unfriendly Climate for Business

From the White House on the heels of the Wagner Act came a thunderous barrage of insults against business. Businessmen, Roosevelt fumed, were obstacles on the road to recovery. He blasted them as “economic royalists” and said that businessmen as a class were “stupid.”36 He followed up the insults with a rash of new punitive measures. New strictures on the stock market were imposed. A tax on corporate retained earnings, called the “undistributed profits tax,” was levied. “These soak-the-rich efforts,” writes economist Robert Higgs, “left little doubt that the president and his administration intended to push through Congress everything they could to extract wealth from the high-income earners responsible for making the bulk of the nation’s decisions about private investment.”37

During a period of barely two months during late 1937, the market for steel — a key economic barometer — plummeted from 83 percent of capacity to 35 percent. When that news emblazoned headlines, Roosevelt took an ill-timed nine-day fishing trip. The New York Herald-Tribune implored him to get back to work to stem the tide of the renewed Depression. What was needed, said the newspaper’s editors, was a reversal of the Roosevelt policy “of bitterness and hate, of setting class against class and punishing all who disagreed with him.”38

Columnist Walter Lippmann wrote in March 1938 that “with almost no important exception every measure he [Roosevelt] has been interested in for the past five months has been to reduce or discourage the production of wealth.”39

As pointed out earlier in this essay, Herbert Hoover’s own version of a “New Deal” had hiked the top marginal income tax rate from 24 to 63 percent in 1932. But he was a piker compared to his tax-happy successor. Under Roosevelt, the top rate was raised at first to 79 percent and then later to 90 percent. Economic historian Burton Folsom notes that in 1941 Roosevelt even proposed a whopping 99.5-percent marginal rate on all incomes over $100,000. “Why not?” he said when an advisor questioned the idea.40

After that confiscatory proposal failed, Roosevelt issued an executive order to tax all income over $25,000 at the astonishing rate of 100 percent. He also promoted the lowering of the personal exemption to only $600, a tactic that pushed most American families into paying at least some income tax for the first time. Shortly thereafter, Congress rescinded the executive order, but went along with the reduction of the personal exemption.41

Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve again seesawed its monetary policy in the mid-1930s, first up then down, then up sharply through America’s entry into World War II. Contributing to the economic slide of 1937 was this fact: From the summer of 1936 to the spring of 1937, the Fed doubled reserve requirements on the nation’s banks. Experience has shown time and again that a roller-coaster monetary policy is enough by itself to produce a roller-coaster economy.

Still stinging from his earlier Supreme Court defeats, Roosevelt tried in 1937 to “pack” the Supreme Court with a proposal to allow the president to appoint an additional justice to the Court for every sitting justice who had reached the age of 70 and did not retire. Had this proposal passed, Roosevelt could have appointed six new justices favorable to his views, increasing the members of the Court from 9 to 15. His plan failed in Congress, but the Court later began rubber-stamping his policies after a number of opposing justices retired. Until Congress killed the packing scheme, however, business fears that a Court sympathetic to Roosevelt’s goals would endorse more of the old New Deal prevented investment and confidence from reviving.

Economic historian Robert Higgs draws a close connection between the level of private investment and the course of the American economy in the 1930s. The relentless assaults of the Roosevelt administration — in both word and deed — against business, property, and free enterprise guaranteed that the capital needed to jump-start the economy was either taxed away or forced into hiding. When FDR took America to war in 1941, he eased up on his anti-business agenda, but a great deal of the nation’s capital was diverted into the war effort instead of into plant expansion or consumer goods. Not until both Roosevelt and the war were gone did investors feel confident enough to “set in motion the postwar investment boom that powered the economy’s return to sustained prosperity.”42

This view gains support in these comments from one of the country’s leading investors of the time, Lammot du Pont, offered in 1937:

Uncertainty rules the tax situation, the labor situation, the monetary situation, and practically every legal condition under which industry must operate. Are taxes to go higher, lower or stay where they are? We don’t know. Is labor to be union or non-union? . . . Are we to have inflation or deflation, more government spending or less? … Are new restrictions to be placed on capital, new limits on profits? … It is impossible to even guess at the answers.”43

Many modern historians tend to be reflexively anti-capitalist and distrustful of free markets; they find Roosevelt’s exercise of power, constitutional or not, to be impressive and historically “interesting.” In surveys, a majority consistently rank FDR near the top of the list for presidential greatness, so it is likely they would disdain the notion that the New Deal was responsible for prolonging the Great Depression. But when a nationally representative poll by the American Institute of Public Opinion in the spring of 1939 asked, “Do you think the attitude of the Roosevelt administration toward business is delaying business recovery?” the American people responded “yes” by a margin of more than 2-to-1. The business community felt even more strongly so.44

In his private diary, FDR’s very own Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, seemed to agree. He wrote: “We have tried spending money. We are spending more than we have ever spent before and it does not work. … We have never made good on our promises. … I say after eight years of this Administration we have just as much unemployment as when we started … and an enormous debt to boot!”45

At the end of the decade and 12 years after the stock market crash of Black Thursday, 10 million Americans were jobless. The unemployment rate was in excess of 17 percent. Roosevelt had pledged in 1932 to end the crisis, but it persisted two presidential terms and countless interventions later.

Whither Free Enterprise?

How was it that FDR was elected four times if his policies were deepening and prolonging an economic catastrophe? Ignorance and a willingness to give the president the benefit of the doubt explain a lot. Roosevelt beat Hoover in 1932 with promises of less government. He instead gave Americans more government, but he did so with fanfare and fireside chats that mesmerized a desperate people. By the time they began to realize that his policies were harmful, World War II came, the people rallied around their commander-in-chief, and there was little desire to change the proverbial horse in the middle of the stream by electing someone new.

Along with the holocaust of World War II came a revival of trade with America’s allies. The war’s destruction of people and resources did not help the U.S. economy, but this renewed trade did. A reinflation of the nation’s money supply counteracted the high costs of the New Deal, but brought with it a problem that plagues us to this day: a dollar that buys less and less in goods and services year after year. Most importantly, the Truman administration that followed Roosevelt was decidedly less eager to berate and bludgeon private investors and as a result, those investors re-entered the economy and fueled a powerful postwar boom. The Great Depression finally ended, but it should linger in our minds today as one of the most colossal and tragic failures of government and public policy in American history.

The genesis of the Great Depression lay in the irresponsible monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. government in the late 1920s and early 1930s. These policies included a litany of political missteps: central bank mismanagement, trade-crushing tariffs, incentive-sapping taxes, mind-numbing controls on production and competition, senseless destruction of crops and cattle and coercive labor laws, to recount just a few. It was not the free market that produced 12 years of agony; rather, it was political bungling on a grand scale.

Those who can survey the events of the 1920s and 1930s and blame free-market capitalism for the economic calamity have their eyes, ears and minds firmly closed to the facts. Changing the wrong-headed thinking that constitutes much of today’s conventional wisdom about this sordid historical episode is vital to reviving faith in free markets and preserving our liberties.

The nation managed to survive both Hoover’s activism and Roosevelt’s New Deal quackery, and now the American heritage of freedom awaits a rediscovery by a new generation of citizens. This time we have nothing to fear but myths and misconceptions.

- END -

Postscript:

Have We Learned Our Lessons?

Eighty years after the Great Depression began, the literature on this painful episode of American history is undergoing an encouraging metamorphosis. The conventional assessment that so dominated historical writings for decades argued that free markets caused the debacle and that FDR’s New Deal saved the country. Surely, there are plenty of poorly-informed partisans, ideologues and quacks that still make these superficial claims. Serious historians and economists, however, have been busy chipping away at the falsehoods. The essay you have just read cites many recent works worth careful reading in their entirety.

At the very moment this latest edition of “Great Myths of the Great Depression” was about to go to press, Simon & Schuster published a splendid new volume I strongly recommend. Authored by the Foundation for Economic Education’s senior historian and Hillsdale College professor, Dr. Burton W. Folsom, the book is provocatively titled “New Deal or Raw Deal? — How FDR’s Economic Legacy Has Damaged America.” It’s one of the most illuminating works on the subject. It will help mightily to correct the record and educate our fellow citizens about what really happened in the 1930s.

Another great addition to the literature, appearing in 2007, is “The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression” by Amity Shlaes. The fact that it has been a New York Times bestseller suggests there is a real hunger for the truth about this period of history.

While Americans may be unlearning some of what they thought they knew about the Great Depression, that’s not the same as saying we have learned the important lessons well enough to avoid making the same mistakes again. Indeed, today we are no closer to fixing the primary cause of the business cycle — monetary mischief — than we were 80 years ago.

The financial crisis that gripped America in 2008 ought to be a wake-up call. The fingerprints of government meddling are all over it. From 2001 to 2005, the Federal Reserve revved up the money supply, expanding it at a feverish double-digit rate. The dollar plunged in overseas markets and commodity prices soared. With the banks flush with liquidity from the Fed, interest rates plummeted and risky loans to borrowers of dubious merit ballooned. Politicians threw more fuel on the fire by jawboning banks to lend hundreds of billions of dollars for subprime mortgages.

When the bubble burst, some of the very culprits who promoted the policies that caused it postured as our rescuers while endorsing new interventions, bigger government, more inflation of money and credit and massive taxpayer bailouts of failing firms. Many of them are also calling for higher taxes and tariffs, the very nonsense that took a recession in 1930 and made it a long and deep depression.

The taxpayer bailouts of agencies such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as a growing number of private firms in the early fall of 2008, represent more folly with a monumental price tag. Not only will we and future generations be paying those bills for decades, the very process of throwing good money after bad will pile moral hazard on top of moral hazard, fostering more bad decisions and future bailouts. This is the stuff that undermines both free enterprise and the soundness of the currency. Much more inflation to pay these bills is more than a little likely, sooner or later.

“Government,” observed the renowned Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises, “is the only institution that can take a valuable commodity like paper, and make it worthless by applying ink.” Mises was describing the curse of inflation, the process whereby government expands a nation’s money supply and thereby erodes the value of each monetary unit — dollar, peso, pound, franc or whatever. It often shows up in the form of rising prices, which most people confuse with the inflation itself. The distinction is an important one because, as economist Percy Greaves explained so eloquently, “Changing the definition changes the responsibility.”

Define inflation as rising prices and, like the clueless Jimmy Carter of the 1970s, you’ll think that oil sheiks, credit cards and private businesses are the culprits, and price controls are the answer. Define inflation in the classic fashion as an increase in the supply of money and credit, with rising prices as a consequence, and you then have to ask the revealing question, “Who increases the money supply?” Only one entity can do that legally; all others are called “counterfeiters” and go to jail.

Nobel laureate Milton Friedman argued indisputably that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary matter. Rising prices no more cause inflation than wet streets cause rain.

Before paper money, governments inflated by diminishing the precious-metal content of their coinage. The ancient prophet Isaiah reprimanded the Israelites with these words: “Thy silver has become dross, thy wine mixed with water.” Roman emperors repeatedly melted down the silver denarius and added junk metals until the denarius was less than one percent silver. The Saracens of Spain clipped the edges of their coins so they could mint more until the coins became too small to circulate. Prices rose as a mirror image of the currency’s worth.

Rising prices are not the only consequence of monetary and credit expansion. Inflation also erodes savings and encourages debt. It undermines confidence and deters investment. It destabilizes the economy by fostering booms and busts. If it’s bad enough, it can even wipe out the very government responsible for it in the first place and then lead to even worse afflictions. Hitler and Napoleon both rose to power in part because of the chaos of runaway inflations.

All this raises many issues economists have long debated: Who or what should determine a nation’s supply of money? Why do governments so regularly mismanage it? What is the connection between fiscal and monetary policy? Suffice it to say here that governments inflate because their appetite for revenue exceeds their willingness to tax or their ability to borrow. British economist John Maynard Keynes was an influential charlatan in many ways, but he nailed it when he wrote, “By a continuing process of inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens.”

So, you say, inflation is nasty business but it’s just an isolated phenomenon with the worst cases confined to obscure nooks and crannies like Zimbabwe. Not so. The late Frederick Leith-Ross, a famous authority on international finance, observed: “Inflation is like sin; every government denounces it and every government practices it.” Even Americans have witnessed hyperinflations that destroyed two currencies — the ill-fated continental dollar of the Revolutionary War and the doomed Confederate money of the Civil War.

Today’s slow-motion dollar depreciation, with consumer prices rising at persistent but mere single-digit rates, is just a limited version of the same process. Government spends, runs deficits and pays some of its bills through the inflation tax. How long it can go on is a matter of speculation, but trillions in national debt and politicians who make misers of drunken sailors and get elected by promising even more are not factors that should encourage us.

Inflation is very much with us but it must end someday. A currency’s value is not bottomless. Its erosion must cease either because government stops its reckless printing or prints until it wrecks the money. But surely, which way it concludes will depend in large measure on whether its victims come to understand what it is and where it comes from. Meanwhile, our economy looks like a roller coaster because Congresses, Presidents and the agencies they’ve empowered never cease their monetary mischief.

Are you tired of politicians blaming each other, scrambling to cover their behinds and score political points in the midst of a crisis, and piling debts upon debts they audaciously label “stimulus packages”? Why do so many Americans want to trust them with their health care, education, retirement and a host of other aspects of their lives? It’s madness writ large. The antidote is the truth. We must learn the lessons of our follies and resolve to fix them now, not later.

To that end, I invite the reader to join the education process. Support organizations like FEE that are working to inform citizens about the proper role of government and how a free economy operates. Help distribute copies of this essay and other good publications that promote liberty and free enterprise. Demand that your representatives in government balance the budget, conform to the spirit and letter of the Constitution and stop trying to buy your vote with other people’s money.

Everyone has heard the sage observation of philosopher George Santayana: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” It’s a warning we should not fail to heed.

Endnotes

1 Alan Reynolds, “What Do We Know About the Great Crash?” National Review, November 9, 1979, p. 1416.

2 Hans F. Sennholz, “The Great Depression,” The Freeman, April 1975, p. 205.

3 Murray Rothbard, America’s Great Depression (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1975), p. 89.

4 Benjamin M. Anderson, Economics and the Public Welfare: A Financial and Economic History of the United States, 1914-46, 2nd edition (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), p. 127.

5 Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1963; ninth paperback printing by Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 411-415.

6 Lindley H. Clark, Jr., “After the Fall,” The Wall Street Journal, October 26, 1979, p. 18.

7 “Tearful Memories That Just Won’t Fade Away,” U. S. News & World Report, October 29, 1979, pp. 36-37.

8 “FDR’s Disputed Legacy,” Time, February 1, 1982, p. 23.

9 Barry W. Poulson, Economic History of the United States (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1981), p. 508.

10 Reynolds, p. 1419.

11 Richard M. Ebeling, “Monetary Central Planning and the State-Part XI: The Great Depression and the Crisis of Government Intervention,” Freedom Daily (Fairfax, Virginia: The Future of Freedom Foundation, November 1997), p. 15.

12 Paul Johnson, A History of the American People (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), p. 740.

13 Ibid., p. 741.

14 Larry Schweikart and Michael Allen, A Patriot’s History of the United States: From Columbus’s Great Discovery to the War on Terror (New York: Sentinel, 2004), p. 553.

15 Ibid., p. 554.

16 “FDR’s Disputed Legacy,” p. 24.

17 Sennholz, p. 210.

18 From The Liberal Tradition: A Free People and a Free Economy by Lewis W. Douglas, as quoted in “Monetary Central Planning and the State, Part XIV: The New Deal and Its Critics,” by Richard M. Ebeling in Freedom Daily, February 1998, p. 12.

19 Friedman and Schwartz, p. 330.

20 Jim Powell, FDR’s Folly: How Roosevelt and His New Deal Prolonged the Great Depression (New York: Crown Forum, 2003), p. 32.

21 John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Crisis, 1928-1938 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), p. 70.

22 Anderson, p. 315.

23 “FDR’s Disputed Legacy,” p. 24.

24 Anderson, p. 336.

25 Ibid., pp. 332-334.

26 “FDR’s Disputed Legacy,” p. 30.

27 John T. Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth (Garden City, N.Y.: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., 1949), p. 45.

28 C. David Tompkins, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg: The Evolution of a Modern Republican, 1884-1945 (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1970), p. 157.

29 Ibid., p. 121.

30 Albert J. Nock, Our Enemy, the State (online at www.barefootsworld.net/nockoets1.html), Chapter 1, Section IV.

31 Martin Morse Wooster, “Bring Back the WPA? It Also Had A Seamy Side,” Wall Street Journal, September 3, 1986, p. A26.

32 Ibid.

33 Johnson, p. 762.

34 Sennholz, pp. 212-213.

35 William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 242.

36 Ibid., pp. 183-184.

37 Robert Higgs, “Regime Uncertainty: Why the Great Depression Lasted So Long and Why Prosperity Resumed After the War,” The Independent Review, Volume I, Number 4: Spring 1997, p. 573.

38 Gary Dean Best, The Critical Press and the New Deal: The Press Versus Presidential Power, 1933-1938 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1993), p. 130.

39 Ibid., p. 136.

40 Burton Folsom, “What’s Wrong With The Progressive Income Tax?”, Viewpoint on Public Issues, No. 99-18, May 3, 1999, Mackinac Center for Public Policy, Midland, Michigan.

41 Ibid.

42 Higgs, p. 564.

43 Quoted in Herman E. Krooss, Executive Opinion: What Business Leaders Said and Thought on Economic Issues, 1920s-1960s (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1970), p. 200.

44 Higgs, p. 577.

45 Blum, pp. 24-25.

Photo Credits

Cover, Artwork based on a poster created by Works Progress Administration between 1941 and 1943.

Page 1, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, [LC-USF34-T01-018258-C DLC].

Page 2, Federal Reserve Building, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Theodor Horydczak Collection [LC-H814-T-F03-003 DLC].

Page 3, Unemployment, Michigan State Archives.

Page 5, Farm Relief Act, Library of Congress, National Photo Company Collection, [LC-USZ62-111718 DLC].

Page 6, Roosevelt, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division [LC-USZ62-117121 DLC].

Page 7, Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Museum.

Page 9, Bridge, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Historic American Buildings Survey or Historic American Engineering Record, Reproduction Number [HAER,?TEX,42-VOS.V,4-].

Page 11, Steel Mill, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Theodor Horydczak Collection [LC-H814-T-0601 DLC].

Page 12, Supreme Court Building, Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA-OWI Collection, [LC-USF34-005615-E DLC].

Page 13, Strikers, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.


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News Flash: FDR Didn’t Fix The Economy!

Posted By Sheldon Richman On December 15, 2008 @ 2:07 pm In TGIF, The Freeman | No Comments

Sheldon Richman [1] is the editor of The Freeman and “In brief,” and author of “Fascism” [2] in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. TGIF appears Fridays. Comments welcome at “Anything Peaceful.” [3]

The New Deal did not end the Great Depression. This statement will come as no shock to FEE supporters, but it will to the many people who never encountered it before. Now people are encountering it — in newspaper columns and news-talk shows.

Why, after years of being taught that Franklin Roosevelt’s economic intervention saved the country from disaster, is the general public now being told — by FDR fans, not critics — that this is not the case?

It’s the Rooseveltians’ way of helping President Obama get over any fear he has of deficit spending. Paul Krugman [4], the newest Nobel laureate, a Keynesian, and a New York Times columnist, is explicit about this. “[H]ow much guidance does the Roosevelt era really offer for today’s world?” Krugman asks. “The answer is, a lot. But Barack Obama should learn from F.D.R.’s failures as well as from his achievements: the truth is that the New Deal wasn’t as successful in the short run as it was in the long run. And the reason for F.D.R.’s limited short-run success, which almost undid his whole program, was the fact that his economic policies were too cautious.”

By “too cautious” Krugman means that FDR’s deficits were too small. Roosevelt ran deficits (except for one year), but they were about the same size as those run by his predecessor, Herbert Hoover. Roosevelt’s biggest deficit, in 1936, was “only” 4.4 percent of GDP, Jim Powell points out in FDR’s Folly. Both Hoover and Roosevelt were big spenders — FDR doubled spending by 1940 — but they were also big taxers, which kept the deficit from growing. This is confirmed by University of Arizona economist Price Fishback [5], who wrote, “Once we take into account the taxation during the 1930’s, we can see that the budget deficits of the 1930’s and one balanced budget were tiny relative to the size of the problem….”

Roosevelt was quite a tax enthusiast. He levied or raised taxes on liquor, tobacco, gasoline, corporate dividends, estates, incomes (top rate 75 percent versus Hoover’s 63), “excess” profits, and undistributed profits. (The last tax was repealed in 1939.) And then there was the payroll tax that came in with Social Security. All in all, the New Deal more than tripled the tax burden from 1933 to 1940: $1.6 billion to $5.3 billion. Serious deficit-spenders don’t raise taxes. But Roosevelt did. Is it any wonder that net investment dropped $3.1 billion during the decade or that unemployment [6] was about as high in 1939 as it was in 1932?

Would Bigger Deficits Have Worked?

This raises the question of whether big-time deficit spending would have ended the Depression. Krugman and others think so. But how could it? Deficits are financed either by borrowing or by creating money out of nothing. When the government borrows money, that’s money no one else can borrow and invest. Where’s the gain? Moreover, the money is put to purposes selected by politicians, not entrepreneurs trying to please consumers.

When the government creates money, three things happen. First, the new money lowers interest rates below the level justified by society’s time preference; that produces perverse incentives to invest in longer-term projects far from the consumer-goods level. Second, the money early on changes relative prices (rather than raising prices evenly) because particular economic interests get it sooner than everyone else. Third, prices later rise generally, reducing everyone’s purchasing power. The result is a distorted structure of production and a boom that is unsustainable because it’s based not on real savings but on fiat money. When the inflation stops, the bust follows.

Since the New Deal didn’t end the Depression and a New Deal on steroids wouldn’t have done so, President Obama should pay no heed to Krugman and his Keynesian economic advisers. The way to wake up the economy is reduce the total government burden on producers and consumers by, among other things, slashing spending, taxes, and borrowing.


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URLs in this post:

[1] Sheldon Richman: mailto:srichman@fee.org?subject=

[2] “Fascism”: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Fascism.html

[3] “Anything Peaceful.”: http://www.feeblog.org/

[4] Paul Krugman: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/opinion/10krugman.html

[5] Price Fishback: http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2377

[6] unemployment: http://www.econreview.com/events/ur1932b.htm

Bastiat and Bailout Blunders

Posted By William Anderson On December 24, 2008 @ 9:46 am In Articles, Not So Fast! | 2 Comments

When President George W. Bush promised government aid to General Motors, Ford and Chrysler, no doubt he read the New York Times, which has given economic advice even as its own media empire threatens to collapse financially. Perhaps he read the Washington Post or other mainstream publications that demanded government print more money, fix the balance sheets of bankrupt companies, and go on a spending spree of its own.

Even the thoughtful Stephen Chapman [1] of the Chicago Tribune has called for inflation as a way (temporarily) to boost the economy. (One expects such nonsense from Paul Krugman and cheerleaders for the state, but when libertarians join the inflation chorus, we know we a crisis exists.)

Yet, there is someone that President Bush or Krugman and others with political power or influence have not read, although his words are wiser than those of all the modern political pundits put together: Frederic Bastiat. Readers of The Freeman or the FEE webpage likely are familiar with this French statesman who wrote some of the best economic prose of the Nineteenth – or any other – Century. We revisit one of his great works: That Which is Seen and That Which is Not Seen [2], completed in 1850, shortly before his death.

Bastiat explains that economic analysis depends not only upon observing those things which are readily visible – domestic auto workers receiving paychecks instead of being laid off – but also those things which do not happen because of the original action, things that in the long run would be more economically (and socially) beneficial. He writes:

In the department of economy, an act, a habit, an institution, a law, gives birth not only to an effect, but to a series of effects. Of these effects, the first only is immediate; it manifests itself simultaneously with its cause - it is seen. The others unfold in succession - they are not seen: it is well for us, if they are foreseen. Between a good and a bad economist this constitutes the whole difference - the one takes account of the visible effect; the other takes account both of the effects which are seen, and also of those which it is necessary to foresee. Now this difference is enormous, for it almost always happens that when the immediate consequence is favourable, the ultimate consequences are fatal, and the converse. Hence it follows that the bad economist pursues a small present good, which will be followed by a great evil to come, while the true economist pursues a great good to come, - at the risk of a small present evil.

Indeed, the “bad” economists have advised short-sighted politicians (Dare I repeat myself?) to do the most visible things. The news cameras will show the autoworkers in Detroit going to work instead of being laid off. When Congress and the incoming presidential administration raise the minimum wage, the news cameras will record the life of a single mother who has received a raise.

The cameras, however, will not record those millions of people elsewhere who lose their jobs because resources are being diverted from productive uses to the political uses of propping up automobile companies that have been a rendition of the “living dead” for many years. The cameras will not record those thousands of single mothers who are thrown out of work because the increase in the minimum wage essentially priced them out of the labor market.

Over time, unfortunately, that which is not seen at first ultimately is seen in its full horror. Nearly 80 years ago, presidents Herbert Hoover and FDR tried to prop up the U.S. economy by forcing up real wages, bailing out failing firms, promoting labor unions (and the violence that inevitably accompanies their activities), and inflating the dollar. What ultimately was seen was a decade of high unemployment which ended in the horror of world warfare.

Instead, of reading Krugman and other “distinguished” economists, perhaps policymakers should discover Bastiat. What he wrote 150 years ago still is more cogent and relevant than the entirety of what the political classes and their media allies are telling us today.


Article printed from Foundation for Economic Education: http://fee.org

URL to article: http://fee.org/articles/bastiat-and-bailout-blunders/

URLs in this post:

[1] Stephen Chapman: http://www.reason.com/news/show/130681.html

[2] That Which is Seen and That Which is Not Seen: http://bastiat.org/en/twisatwins.html

How a Free Society Could Solve Global Warming

Gene Callahan is the author of Economics for Real People. He thanks Robert P. Murphy and Sudha Shenoy for their help in preparing this article.

The phrase“global warming” has been around for quite some time, but in the past year it has captured the spotlight as never before. One can’t turn on the radio or open a newspaper without facing ads from “green” corporations, or hearing the latest way to reduce one’s “carbon footprint.” With even prominent Republicans (such as Arnold Schwarzenegger and George W. Bush) on board, it seems all but inevitable that major governments around the world will enact new policies to combat this ostensible threat—and to cripple economic growth in the process.

Thus far the typical libertarian response to the growing clamor has been to challenge the science behind it. Now it really is the scientific consensus that global warming occurred during the twentieth century. What is not so obvious is that (1) humans caused this warming and (2) this warming is necessarily bad.

Although it is interesting to explore the question of whether science has been perverted in the cause of environmentalism, there is a danger for libertarians in pinning their entire case on this strategy. After all, every serious student of science knows that when it comes to empirical claims, we never achieve certainty. For example, even if today one thinks that there are insurmountable problems facing the theory of manmade global warming, one still must accept the possibility that new evidence or theoretical advances could indicate that the environmentalists are perfectly right. Another possibility is that there is some other, similar disaster lurking unsuspected.

For these reasons, I believe it is crucial to accept provisionally, for the sake of argument, the scientific claims behind the case for manmade global warming. In the present article I will demonstrate that it still would not follow that the taxes and other regulations typically proposed by greens are the best way to address the problem. Just as the free market is still the optimal economic arrangement, regardless of how many citizens are angels or devils, so too does the free market outperform government intervention, regardless of the fragility of Earth’s ecosystems.

When trying to determine if the free market is to blame for possibly dangerous carbon emissions, a logical starting point is to list the numerous ways that government policies encourage the very activities that Al Gore and his friends want us to curtail.

The U.S. government has subsidized many activities that burn carbon: it has seized land through eminent domain to build highways, funded rural electrification projects, and fought wars to ensure Americans’ access to oil. After World War II it played a key role in the mass exodus of the middle class from urban centers to the suburbs, chiefly through encouraging mortgage lending.

Every American schoolchild has heard of the bold transcontinental railroad (finished with great ceremony at Promontory Summit, Utah) promoted by the federal government. Historian Burt Folsom explains that due to the construction contracts, the incentive was to lay as much track as possible between points A and B—hardly an approach to economize on carbon emissions from the wood- and coal-burning locomotives. For a more recent example, consider John F. Kennedy’s visionary moon shot. I’m no engineer, but I’ve seen the takeoffs of the Apollo spacecraft and think it’s quite likely that the free market’s use of those resources would have involved far lower CO2 emissions. While myriad government policies have thus encouraged carbon emissions, at the same time the government has restricted activities that would have reduced them. For example, there would probably be far more reliance on nuclear power were it not for the overblown regulations of this energy source. For a different example, imagine the reduction in emissions if the government would merely allow market-clearing pricing for the nation’s major roads, thereby eliminating traffic jams! The pollution from vehicles in major urban areas could be drastically cut overnight if the government set tolls to whatever the market could bear—or better yet, sold bridges and highways to private owners.

Of course, there is no way to determine just what the energy landscape in America would look like if these interventions had not occurred. Yet it is entirely possible that on net, with a freer market economy, in the past we would have burned less fossil fuel and today we would be more energy efficient.

Even if it were true that reliance on the free-enterprise system makes it difficult to curtail activities that contribute to global warming, still the undeniable advantages of unfettered markets would allow humans to deal with climate change more easily. For example, the financial industry, by creating new securities and derivative markets, could crystallize the “dispersed knowledge” that many different experts held in order to coordinate and mobilize mankind’s total response to global warming. For instance, weather futures can serve to spread the risk of bad weather beyond the local area affected. Perhaps there could arise a market betting on the areas most likely to be permanently flooded. That may seem ghoulish, but by betting on their own area, inhabitants could offset the cost of relocating should the flooding occur. Creative entrepreneurs, left free to innovate, will generate a wealth of alternative energy sources. (State intervention, of course, tends to stifle innovations that threaten the continued dominance of currently powerful special interests, such as oil companies—for example, the state of North Carolina recently fined Bob Teixeira for running his car on soybean oil.)

Private insurers have a strong incentive to assess the potential effects of global warming without bias in order to price their policies optimally—if they overestimate the risk, they will lose business to lower-priced rivals; if they are too sanguine about the dangers, they will lose money once the claims start rolling in. Individuals finding their homes or businesses threatened by rising sea levels will find it easier to relocate to the extent that unfettered markets have made them wealthier. Industrial manufacturers, as long as they are held liable for the negative environmental effects of their production processes—a traditional common-law liability from which state policies intended to “promote industry” have often sought to shield manufacturers—will strive to develop technologies that minimize the environmental impact of their activities without sacrificing efficiency. Government interventions and “five-year plans,” even when they are sincere attempts to protect the environment rather than disguised schemes to benefit some powerful lobby, lack the profit incentive and are protected from the competitive pressures that drive private actors to seek an optimal cost-benefit tradeoff.

If the situation truly becomes dire, it will be free-market capitalism that allows humans to develop techniques for sucking massive amounts of carbon out of the atmosphere, and to colonize the oceans and outer space. Beyond these futuristic possibilities, the obvious responses to global warming—such as more houses with AC, sturdier sea walls, and better equipment to evacuate flooded regions—are again only feasible when the free market is unleashed.

It is the poorest people and nations that stand to suffer the most if the worst-case scenario for global warming is realized, and the only reliable way to alleviate their poverty, and thus help protect them from those effects, is the free market.

Can the Market Meet the Threat Head-On?

In the first section I summarized some of the ways governments inadvertently contribute to the very activities that allegedly cause dangerous global warming; in the second I sketched some of the ways that free markets allow humans to better adapt to climate change. However, I haven’t really tackled the problem directly. Am I conceding that with a worldwide problem the market—which is just dandy for one-on-one interactions—can’t match the concerted “will of the people” working through their elected representatives for a common solution?

Of course not. Even when economic transactions generate so-called negative externalities (activities that shower harms on third parties), I still contend that the free market is the best institution for identifying and reducing the problems.

One way negative externalities can be addressed without turning to state coercion is public censure of individuals or groups widely perceived to be flouting core moral principles or trampling the common good, even if their actions are not technically illegal. Large, private companies and prominent, wealthy individuals are generally quite sensitive to public pressure campaigns.

To cite just one recent, significant example, Temple Grandin, a notable advocate for the humane treatment of livestock, asserts that McDonald’s is the world leader in improving slaughterhouse conditions. While many executives at the fast-food giant genuinely may be concerned with the welfare of cattle, pigs, and chickens, undoubtedly a strong element of self-interest is also at work here, as the company realizes that corporate image affects consumers’ buying decisions.

But that self-interest does not negate the laudable outcome of the pressure McDonald’s has applied to its suppliers to meet the stringent standards it has set for animal-handling facilities. Similarly, to the degree that the broad public regards manmade global warming as a serious problem, companies will strive to be seen as “good corporate citizens” that are addressing the matter. And this isn’t ivory-tower speculation on my part—I can see the “green friendly” ads already.

Critics of libertarianism sometimes denigrate it as a political program of “market fundamentalism” that, if put into practice, would reduce all human values to the price they can fetch as mere commodities. But that is a caricature of the social arrangements advocated by any sensible libertarian. The great figures of classical-liberal and libertarian thought have always recognized the vital contributions that nonmarket institutions, such as churches, families, charities, social clubs, communities of scholars and their students, art foundations, conservation groups, neighborhood associations, and youth athletic leagues, make to the healthy functioning of a free society. What libertarians offer as an alternative to statism is not a social order that judges every human interaction solely on a miserly calculation of profit or loss, but a society in which every desirable form of voluntary association is allowed to flourish, free from coercive interference by the state.

Customary Law

Besides the samples listed above, most libertarians recognize private or customary law as another important, nonmarket source of social order. A historical case in point is the Anglo-American common-law tradition in which legal norms evolved spontaneously from the customs of the people to whom it applied, rather than through legislation and state planning deliberately aimed at achieving some “public good.” The many centuries during which the common law sustained civic order in the face of inevitable divergences between individual citizens’ own interests demonstrate that a successful legal order does not inevitably require state sponsorship. The common law has shown itself to be fully capable of dealing with a number of issues that, while not exhibiting the worldwide scope of global warming, are still similar to our present concern in arising from the cumulative effects of many individual actions, each of which, regarded in isolation, appears to be unproblematic and not subject to legal sanction. For instance, the salmon-fishing streams of Scotland are a valuable natural resource, and the communities along them have developed quite successful institutions for ensuring the value of the streams is maintained, including private policing and legal penalties for overfishing and for polluting the water.

The many cases in which voluntary solutions to problems of collective choice have worked pose an empirical embarrassment for those who argue that “public goods” must be provided by the government. Most advocates of compulsory solutions to pollution abatement, for example, would assert that voluntary efforts will be vitiated by “free riding.” If individuals are not forced to contribute their fair share toward addressing these problems, this argument runs, each person rationally will hold back and hope others will pay for the proposed solution, since any free riders would gain the benefits (such as clean air) anyway. Since almost no one likes to be “the sucker,” it follows that the amount of resources devoted to the provision of the public good will fall woefully shy of the total that would be available if each person gave the amount he’d be willing to give if only he could count on everyone else pitching in equally. The sole solution that can be imagined is for the members of a society to create a “social contract” by which they are forced to pay for pollution abatement.

However, Anthony de Jasay notes in his book The State that this argument is severely flawed. If people cannot solve public-goods problems through voluntary cooperation, how can they rely on politicians’ promises to do so? There is no external authority to enforce those promises. There is only public opinion, the same thing that would enforce voluntary solutions. Moreover, government is itself a “public good” in the sense that free riders benefit from the efforts of those who try to get the government to produce public goods such as clean air.

Is Temperature a Public Good?

Another consideration is that the earth’s temperature isn’t such a public good after all. That is, certain people really do have more at stake, particularly if the warming is moderate. For example, if Manhattan became submerged because of rising sea levels, that calamity would not affect every human being equally. The residents of Manhattan and the owners of its skyscrapers would be hurt far more than people living in inland China. Because all the various potential dangers of global warming affect particular people more intensively than others, it is these groups that (in a free market) would have the incentive to reduce CO2 concentrations. For example, if rising sea levels would cause $10 trillion in damage to a comparatively small group of wealthy individuals, that’s a huge “pie” that the wealthy can offer others to motivate them to reduce emissions.

Despite my optimism about the potential to deal with environmental problems through voluntary means, I don’t wish to be misunderstood: If the official global-warming story is true, it presents a serious problem that humanity will find difficult to solve through voluntary means. But this isn’t a strike against voluntarism—of course a difficult problem will be difficult to solve! By the very same token, the government doesn’t do a terrible job at collecting stray dogs, because that’s a very simple task. When it comes to harder assignments, such as stopping terrorism or reducing teen pregnancy, the government’s record is quite a bit worse.

The very features of the official global-warming scenario that hamper purely private solutions would apply equally to government efforts. For example, even if the U.S. government passed draconian measures at home, that alone wouldn’t be enough if China and Indiadon’t follow suit. And just as private companies in a free market may have an incentive to pollute if they can get away with it, so the state, under the influence of special-interest groups and run by leaders always tempted to ignore the public good in favor of increasing their own power and wealth, can have incentives to allow more pollution than is optimal. (It should be clear the “best” amount of pollution is not zero, because even using fire to cook generates some pollutants, and I doubt that anyone but the most misanthropic, fanatical nature worshippers want to reverse all of the last 40,000 years of human progress.)

As in all debates over public versus private choice, it’s inappropriate to measure a realistic free-market response to global warming against an idealized government program. We must try to envision what real people would do if their property rights were respected and compare that scenario with the probable outcome of actual politicians in today’s world being given a blank check in the name of saving the earth.

Government programs don’t ameliorate world poverty or sickness, and no libertarian would deny that these are serious problems. So even if manmade global warming is a real threat, why should we expect governments to get it right on this issue?

Free-Market Education

Daily Article by | Posted on 12/25/2008 12:00:00 AM

A high-school calculus teacher scored a victory for capitalism and dealt socialized education quite a blow this year. A recent article in USA Today reported that Tom Farber had devised a brilliant, free-market way of funding the tests that he felt were necessary for his students.

Mr. Farber was faced with a dilemma felt by teachers across the country. His supplies budget was cut by the district, which meant that if Farber wanted to give his students the much-needed practice tests that would prepare them for later placement tests, he would have to find funding elsewhere. Many teachers either would have paid for the additional expense out of their own pocket or deprived their students of the requisite practice tests. Farber estimated that, had he paid for the copies out of pocket, it would have cost him almost $200.

Unwilling to shortchange his students or to pay for the copies himself, the visionary teacher found an alternative: he began to sell advertisements on his test papers. According to USA Today, he charged $10 per ad on quizzes, $20 per ad on chapter tests, and $30 per ad on semester finals. Within a few days he had over 75 email requests for ads! Farber has already generated $350 in ad revenue. The article also states that approximately 67% of the ad sales are inspirational messages, paid for by parents. Others are from local businesses.

This free-market solution enables parents to voluntarily provide additional funding in order to help their children. It also allows local businesses to benefit from targeted advertising. Local businesses may also benefit from an improved labor pool due to the improved education students receive from their funding. It is an excellent example of parties participating in voluntary exchange and everyone benefiting: students benefit from the improved education; parents are pleased by improved placement scores; and businesses benefit from a better labor force and more customers. This is capitalism at its finest.

Unfortunately, we live in a time when the knee-jerk reaction is to demand more funding from the government. Mr. Farber has demonstrated that free-market solutions are superior to any that can be provided by government. This also provides a prime example of one of the fundamental flaws with government funding. Government-funded organizations inherently rely on thinking in which decisions are made from the top and imposed on the lower levels. This stifles the ingenuity of the people who have firsthand experience actually doing the work and defers decision making to bureaucrats and committees.

If we are to believe that monopolies are bad because they do not have the best interest of the consumer in mind and have little incentive to improve their product, then why are we to believe that a government monopoly over schooling is good?

It can be reasonably argued that this particular government monopoly is worse than private-sector monopolies, because citizens are forced to pay even if they do not consume the service. To illustrate the point, consider a hypothetical shoe monopoly. If the government declared that shoes are a practical necessity of life in this country, and that there are people unable to afford the best-quality shoes available in the free market, would we then support a "shoe tax" to allow the government to manufacture and distribute shoes free of charge to everyone?

In this scenario, citizens could still purchase shoes from other providers but would be forced to pay their share of the "shoe tax" as well. Since the citizens are already paying for these government shoes (through taxation), the demand for private-sector-produced shoes would be fairly low. Since the demand for privately made shoes would be low, those who desire better shoes would be forced to pay prices that are far higher than those that existed prior to government shoes. The citizens, seeing the high price tag on privately made shoes, would then conclude that they really do need government shoes because only an elite few could afford private shoes.

The success of Farber's experiment shows that, contrary to the common contention, parents would not be forced to shoulder the cost of educating their children alone in the absence of public schools. This is concrete proof that businesses do understand the importance of well-educated students and are willing to provide funding for such a valuable resource. Advertisement revenue is not the only source of funding for schools but it is an important illustration of one of the ways of providing excellent education without extracting funds by force.

Under the current system, everyone is forced to provide funding for schools, regardless of how poor the quality of education provided by those schools. Under a private system, various schools would compete for students and for funding. Both parents and businesspeople would be more willing to devote their resources to the better schools. Students would be the ultimate beneficiaries of such competition.

Many people would agree that the education provided in public schools today is far less than ideal. While there are public schools that provide excellent educations for their students, the costs to taxpayers are too high and the funds are obtained in a highly unethical manner. The lesson to be learned from the success of Farber is that truly private education is plausible and even preferable to the current education provided by the government.


About the Author

Photo of Briggs    Armstrong Briggs Armstrong

Briggs Armstrong is a student at Auburn University majoring in accounting and minoring in finance. He is a member of the Auburn University Libertarians, the Auburn Economics Club, and the Auburn Philosophy Club. Send him mail.

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Friday, December 12, 2008

Obama's Back Door to Socialism

The Back Door to Socialism

Daily Article by | Posted on 12/12/2008 12:00:00 AM

Barack Obama plans to initiate public-private partnerships (PPPs) on a grand scale. While the media focuses on Obama's First Dog or his left-handed jump shot, behind the scenes he is planning how to become president of the world. Therefore, it is worth enumerating many of his proposed partnerships so as to expose his actual policies, and then offer an Austro-libertarian analysis of these partnerships. As we will see, a mix of public and private ownership is a socialist arrangement, and a sly tactic employed by those looking for increased power, albeit under a different name: the public-private partnership.

PPPs are essentially contracts between a public agency and a private company where assets, risks, and rewards are shared in providing a good or service to the public. The rationale is typically that private enterprise provides greater efficiency and quality of service, while the government agency furnishes additional capital. They are claimed to (potentially) lead to "happy employees," better educational opportunities, and better public safety. Government agencies reportedly realize cost savings of 20 to 50 percent by using PPPs.

Of course, PPPs, dating back to at least 1652 when the Water Works Company of Boston began providing drinking water to Massachusetts colonists, are nothing new in the United States (or any country), and most government agencies and offices are engaged in using them. From the National Council for Public-Private Partnerships website we read the following:

Public-Private Partnerships [are] used for water/wastewater, transportation, urban development, and delivery of social services, to name only a few areas of application. Today, the average American city works with private partners to perform 23 out of 65 basic municipal services. The use of partnerships is increasing because it provides an effective tool in meeting public needs, improving the quality of services, and [is] more cost effective.

The treatment of so-called "public goods" in neoclassical economics is partly responsible for offering a justification for government intervention in providing for these goods and services. A large part of Obama's economic agenda is to encourage more PPPs —well beyond what neoclassical economists mean by "public goods" (e.g., defense services, streetlights).

Obama claims these partnerships will promote innovation at a local level through federal funding. Before we can engage in an analysis of PPPs, we must provide an overview (lengthy, but I believe worth exposing) of the various partnerships Obama proposes. PPPs will be used in the following ways under an Obama administration:

  1. Deliver real broadband to communities that currently lack it. Encourage PPPs to "get low-income communities and residents connected [through] best practices among those that have deployed citywide free wireless broadband networks and how those lessons learned can be applied in other communities."
  2. Modernize public safety networks and establish a PPP to "facilitate the development of a next generation network for use by public safety agencies on a priority basis."
  3. Award public contracts to companies committed to American workers and end tax breaks for companies that send jobs overseas.
  4. Create a national network of public-private business incubators by "investing $250 million per year to increase the number and size of incubators in disadvantaged communities throughout the country."
  5. Expand PPPs to advance "leading edge technologies" in space and aeronautics research to spur economic growth and innovation.
  6. Provide funding for "Early Learning Challenge Grants" where states will have to, among other requirements, develop strong public-private partnerships.
  7. Establish a Presidential Early Learning Council to expand public/private investments in the "youngest children."
  8. Issue competitive grants to PPPs for evidence-based models to help students graduate.
  9. Mandate public service and require American middle and high school students to perform 50 hours of service a year, and for all college students to perform 100 hours of service a year. At the community level, PPPs will be used so "students can serve more outside the classroom."
  10. Develop and deploy clean coal technology by using the Department of Energy to enter into PPPs to develop five new commercial scale "coal-fired plants with clean carbon capture and sequestration technology."
  11. Expand PPPs between schools and arts organizations by increasing resources for the US Department of Education's Arts Education Model Development and Dissemination Grants.
  12. Improve and expand PPPs to increase cultural and arts exchanges throughout the world and promote "cultural diplomacy."
  13. Interact with the private sector from "electronic health records to the general supply chain."

PPPs: An Economic Analysis

Obama uses PPPs to justify government involvement and intervention, and he typically associates PPPs with innovation, which seems like an oxymoron. Fortunately, the Austrian economist can point out the many likely effects and unintended consequences of government intervention in the form of PPPs, including the (tragic) effects on entrepreneurship. We will discuss a few of these, using as our guide Mises's excellent and insightful book, Bureaucracy. Two topics often associated with entrepreneurship, innovation and risk, are perhaps the most pertinent in our discussion.

Innovation

One of the reasons Obama gives as a justification for these partnerships is to "spur innovation." There are many reasons why this will prove difficult, if not impossible. Private businesses that have a government-granted monopoly from a PPP will have less (or no) competition, decreasing any incentive to increase efficiency and provide better quality services and products at lower prices. With a government guarantee of revenue, either through the company (or government) charging a fee to customers for its services, or through government subsidy, there is less incentive to cut costs.

Innovation is also less likely if the partnership specifies revenue will be obtained in a "cost plus percentage" arrangement where companies will be guaranteed a specified amount of gross profit, regardless of revenue or cost. When the PPP contract guarantees a period of time (typically years), companies may no longer be interested in increasing profits as there is little danger of going out of business during that timeframe. Thus, PPPs have no stringent requirement of meeting the market profit-and-loss test, since they cannot "lose."

Mises pointed out the flaw in trying to use PPPs as a catalyst to innovation:

To say to the entrepreneur of an enterprise with limited profit chances, "Behave as the conscientious bureaucrats do," is tantamount to telling him to shun any reform. Nobody can be at the same time a correct bureaucrat and an innovator. Progress is precisely that which the rules and regulations did not foresee; it is necessarily outside the field of bureaucratic activities.

In addition, progress and innovation may also be trapped by old government regulations, codes, and established ideas. "If it ain't broke, don't fix it," is the motto of the government bureaucrat—and as Mises points out, these are typically old men with established ideas of what works (and what doesn't). In contrast, innovation is more than just making sure a product "ain't broke"—it is about improving an already functional and highly demanded product (think iPhone in the wireless industry, or Google Chrome in web browsers).

In contrast to private businesses, companies in a government partnership that wish to introduce innovations require going through red tape and levels of bureaucracy for approval. If it were not for a government guarantee of monopoly privilege, such a time gap for bureaucratic approval would likely eliminate any first-mover advantage in the market.

Furthermore, investment capital will not necessarily be generated from savings or business operations, but possibly from a shared government budget. Finally, instead of an incentive to earn as much profit as possible, governments often set a limit on the amount of total profit, and tax or remove any profit above the arbitrarily specified amount, thereby discouraging innovation.

Risk

Risk is another aspect that needs to be analyzed in relation to PPPs. Companies that are guaranteed a government contract in some situations may be less likely to take on risk, as risk only disrupts the existing circumstances, and increases the possibility of failure. This is because the company is "safe" (i.e., its revenue is virtually guaranteed) if it does not take any risks. Any risk the company takes may lead to its loss, not the government's.

Companies in a partnership with government will also lose (ultimate) control of their decision-making abilities. For instance, government would be less likely to allow a company to take risks that could affect any government "revenue" originating from the company. Maintaining the status quo is the name of the game. Companies must, in the end, follow the government's wishes and whims, not their own—nor their customers'. The company sees risk not in terms of whether the consumer will buy its product or service, but in terms of whether it is in line with the designs of the bureaucrat. Any risk then becomes focused on pleasing the bureaucrat, at the expense of pleasing the consumer.

On the other hand, risk of failure is essentially reduced to nil for the length of the contract due to government's ability to subsidize losses through taxation or other coercive measures. Obtaining government contracts for smaller companies becomes virtually impossible; and it eliminates any future or start-up companies and investment in that market. Thus, competition and the threat of competition are close to none. We now see that government is truly the enemy—not the oft-viewed, and mistakenly confused, supporter—of the start-up entrepreneur, i.e., the "little guy."

In a PPP, while revenues are guaranteed for the length of the partnership agreement, stability is only limited to the length of the current administration, i.e., to the trust placed in government to keep its agreements and promises. Ironically, by the very act of creating a public-private partnership in an industry, and eliminating or decreasing competition, government reduces that credibility, and other industries are at risk of similar partnership arrangements.

What is left of capitalism in the United States will be uprooted and supplanted with corporatism; any remnants of a free market will have to yield to the coercive measures of government, resulting in monopolies and cartels.

PPPs as a Justification for Bigger Government

When government is able to partner with a private company and grant access to land, labor, or capital that would not have occurred absent government intervention, everyone's property is exposed to the risk of government takeover. A private company may not be able to construct a highway through the private property of others. Government, through powers of eminent domain, is able to seize private property from individuals and construct nearly anything it desires. In other words, government is able to not only extract money from private individuals (taxes) but also to take away their (more tangible) private property.

In addition, public-private partnerships, because of the word "private," are often viewed as more legitimate, and with less hostility, than solely the term "public." Thus PPPs may expand and multiply without real justification, and with little hostility. The (already flawed and misunderstood) meaning of "public goods" then expands beyond the initial neoclassical interpretation to mean anything that could be deemed good for the public.

Murray Rothbard explains how government's violent intervention in one part of the economy results in "calculational chaos," which inevitably spreads to other parts:

[E]ach governmental firm introduces its own island of chaos into the economy; there is no need to wait for socialism for chaos to begin its work. No government enterprise can ever determine prices or costs or allocate factors or funds in a rational, welfare-maximizing manner.

Rothbard states that government cannot be run on a "business basis":

[A]ny government operation injects a point of chaos into the economy; and since all markets are interconnected in the economy, every governmental activity disrupts and distorts pricing, the allocation of factors, consumption/investment ratios, etc. Every government enterprise not only lowers the social utilities of the consumers by forcing the allocation of funds to ends other than those desired by the public; it also lowers the utility of everyone (including, perhaps, the utilities of government officials) by distorting the market and spreading calculational chaos. The greater the extent of government ownership, of course, the more pronounced will this impact become.

Thus, the greater the extent of government ownership, the larger the amount of calculational chaos, and the closer we move toward socialism.

Conclusion: The Power of Ideas

In 1942, Joseph Schumpeter wrote that capitalism would be threatened and condemned by intellectuals, not for its failures, but its successes—and that socialism was inevitable. It seems the public desires the move toward socialism. There are more and more clamors for government intervention in nearly every aspect of an individual's diurnal activities—and as H.L. Mencken said, "Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want and deserve to get it good and hard." Government propaganda is required to promote such a foolish message. Mises phrased it accurately: "Truth does not need any propaganda; it holds its own."

The danger in public-private partnerships and their promotion by both government bureaucrats and private businesspersons was perhaps best expressed by Rothbard:

What's needed is a corporate spokesman [and government bureaucrat] who embraces the government-business partnership with enthusiasm and joy. … When such a champion emerges, Mr. and Ms. America, keep a sharp eye on your wallets—you are about to be fleeced.

Nevertheless, there is hope. We live in a world of ideas, where the QWERTY keyboard is truly mightier than the latest military contraption. The rapidity and magnitude of government failure, and the more it is exposed and can be replaced with the idea of free markets—and with greater communications technology than at any other time in history, ideas can spread faster than ever—the faster will be the shift toward free markets, and most likely toward a level of prosperity never before experienced. Obama's public-private partnerships would become extinct and despised, being recognized for what they are: back-door socialism, making a mockery of true partnerships and freedom. Entrepreneurship and innovation would be free to flourish in such an environment.

Thursday, December 11, 2008

Is America Going the Way of France?

Going the Way of France (1790)

Daily Article by | Posted on 12/11/2008 12:00:00 AM

French assignat, 1795

First printed in 1896 and as unfortunately pertinent today as it was then, Dr. Andrew Dickson White's Fiat Money Inflation in France chronicles the national suicide of an imposing empire that choked to death on one of mankind's more foolish delusions — the stubborn belief that money does grow on trees. Dr. White's style makes the book an easy read, even during the frightening parts that sound as if lifted directly from today's newspapers.

Weighing in at a light sixty-eight pages, the book nonetheless packs a wallop. It is well-researched and — most surprising for a history book — full of laugh-out-loud moments. One-hundred-plus years have done nothing to diminish the effect of Dr. White's prose.[1] Only in the author's method of referring to the numbers involved — numbers that then seemed so fantastic yet are commonplace today — does the book show any signs of dating. This leads you to read, for example, "twenty eight hundred millions" instead of $2.8 billion — billions likely being beyond the thought process of the people of his time.

Not beyond ours, though; we're up to a trillion.

File Under "Idea, Not a Good One"

The issue of paper will show that gold is not necessary.

–Mirabeau, French politician (1790)

Wisdom comes and goes; lessons are learned hard then hardly remembered. Mankind's endless stupidity on the subject of paper money surely ranks up there in the realm of the sublime. We are forever like Charlie Brown, trying and trying to kick Lucy's football. Generation follows generation, each refusing to learn one of life's more important lessons — nobody must be allowed license to counterfeit. Fiat Money Inflation in France uses as its lesson plan the tragedy of France in the 1790s and Dr. White moves the tale along at a steady clip.

His prose is pointed but polite, and makes no bones about giving credit where credit is due. On the plus side of the ledger, he notes that France was not plunged into a decade-long economic pit by wild-eyed fools, but rather by calm, well-educated ones. The smartest guys in the room whose ideas brought about the tragedy "were universally recognized as among the most skillful and honest financiers in Europe" (p. 47).

Because France in 1789 was in an economic downturn, the idea that the difficulties were due to a lack of money — and that more of it would be nice — caught the imagination of many people. France boasted its own Bernankes, Paulsons, and Greenspans, and when not misthinking, they were off making the rounds of Parisian salons, talking peoples' ears off about how fiat money, despite its disastrous history, could work if only done better — and better is what they intended.

"France was not plunged into a decade-long economic pit by wild-eyed fools, but rather by calm, well-educated ones."

Fiat money, declared the experts, was a means of "securing resources without paying interest" (p. 2). The idea promised that from nothing there would be something — or, as Keynes would later put it, from stone there shall be bread. Nobody was thinking this one through.

Soon the doctrine wormed into the ears of the French politicians who, upon having it explained to them that the plan called for them to print money whenever they wanted, were quickly convinced the whole thing was a splendid idea.

France in 1790 was on a gold standard, with the livre being the unit of measure, but the government would now issue paper money, too. It was to be backed not by gold but by church land stolen specifically for the purpose, and under the authority of The Will of the People. While France had just experienced a harsh lesson in paper money not too long before the coming madness — with John Law's 1720 paper-money schemes — members of the French central government insisted that John Law's paper notes did in fact bring prosperity, "and the ruin they caused resulted from their over-issue, and that such an over-issue is possible only under a despotism" (p. 4).

"We don't live under a despotism!" everyone agreed, and promptly voted to issue $400 million livres' worth of paper money, backed by the stolen church land and paying interest to the holder at three percent annually. Not five months later, $800 million more were printed, the notes not bearing any interest at all. With the currency now nice and elastic (before it all collapsed in 1796), the French politicians were madly printing money in secret, running the printing-press workers at a very un-French-like fourteen hours per day.[2] In less than six years, the French politicians printed over $45 billion in irredeemable paper — and that was when $45 billion was a lot of money.

Those few goldbugs who always doubted the soundness of fiat money — paper currency without a metal anchor — have in large measure been vindicated. But why were the rest of us so blinded by money illusion?
Niall Ferguson (2008)

It is where Dr. White outlines the effects of all this inflation on France that the book reads like today's paper. Prices rose as the value of the currency endlessly fell; savings dwindled while debt loads rose; a spirit of gambling took hold, and bribery flourished. I just Googled those terms plus "America," and we're four for four.

Dr. White created the book from a series of lectures given during his time at Cornell University and the University of Michigan. Judging by how the book reads, he must have been quite the speaker. Describing Mirabeau's impassioned 1790 speech in support of paper, he writes of its oratorical beauty, of how it was frequently interrupted by applause, yet how listening to the opinion of a man who never studied the subject he's yammering about (Mirabeau knew nothing of economics) "was like summoning a prize fighter to mend a watch" (p. 18).

And that went for the rest of the French Assembly, too, bursting with plans to "fix" the economy but full of "men who had never shown any ability to make or increase fortunes for themselves (yet) abounded in brilliant plans for creating and increasing wealth for the country at large" (p. 17). They soon would fall back to the politician's more natural road to wealth, as their newly found power to dispense endlessly available money made them obvious candidates to bribe for legislative favors. Dr. White tries to see the bright side by writing "it is some comfort to know that nearly all concerned were guillotined for it" (p. 30).

What is best about the book is that it is, at its base, a plea for the poor — an appeal to grant them the protection afforded by gold. Dr. White shows a progressive mind in his concern for the less fortunate, always the ultimate victim of inflation, which "creates on the ruins of the prosperity of all men of meager means a class of debauched speculators, the most injurious class that a nation can harbor" (p. 5).

Don't we know it.

No, Virginia, Money Does Not Grow On Trees

On whom did this vast depreciation mainly fall at last? Men of small means.

–Andrew Dickson White (1896)

Using the French monetary collapse of 1796 as a lesson to teach a greater point — to warn against fiat currency — the book is unabashedly supportive of a gold standard. At the time of its publication in 1896 this position was not only respected; it was mainstream — proponents of paper money were the kooks. Now the shoe is firmly on the other foot: polite people do not talk about a gold standard. Maybe they should start.

The purpose of a gold standard — what makes it so indispensable to a system of economic justice — is that it takes the power to create money and credit at will out of the politicians' hands — in fact, out of anyone's hands. No man, no matter how virtuous and saintly, can long resist the call of the money machine; and the political world, where virtue and saints are always in meager supply, is a particularly dangerous place for it to reside.

The removal of the gold standard from our lives, Robert Samuelson recently noted, has "created an entirely new situation…inflation would no longer control itself." With Nixon's repudiation of the US dollar's remaining link to gold in 1971, we've all taken a time machine back to 1790s France, and so far it's been a less-than-excellent adventure.[3]

"Polite people do not talk about a gold standard. Maybe they should start."

We have substituted for the steady, disinterested hand of gold the arbitrary, rapacious vagaries of the politician; yet we wonder why prices do nothing but float upward, year after year, until grandma is eating cat food. Whenever and wherever paper money has been introduced, from France in the 1790s to America in 2008, a steadily debased currency and a steadily debased economy have followed, as "there is a natural law of rapidly increasing emissions and depreciation" (p. 21).

Inflation as a deliberate policy is fit for nobody but street junkies; it is a method of short-term, artificial pleasure at the certain cost of long-term pain. But "long term" is a misleading, soothing term meant to calm nerves. The "long term" always inevitably morphs into "right now," and towards the foolish he's a vicious bastard. A glance at America's money-supply growth since 1971 — and since the Federal Reserve's creation in 1913, for that matter — gives notice that many have been fools.

The French of the late 1790s, like so many people in so many times, believed in "the doctrine that all currency…derives its efficiency from the stamp it bears" (p. 22), and therefore we can print as much of that currency as we please. Dr. White identifies that flawed doctrine as the root cause of the disaster.

In France during 1790 to 1796 the economic dislocations gained steam as the currency dove towards zero, leading politicians to pass a desperate intervention, followed in time by another even more desperate; and soon Marat, one of the most powerful men in French politics, was openly calling for the people to murder the shopkeepers and plunder their inventory. (That was his economic stimulus package.) The price inflation rent the fabric of French civilization; just the attempt alone to enforce price controls had the guillotines chopping steadily.

As much as the French of the 1790s, we too wished to be "delivered by this grand means from all uncertainty and from all ruinous results of the credit system" (p. 8), and now, also like the 1790s French, we have discovered that where "commerce was dead; betting took its place" (p. 27). We too sat at dinner parties and prattled on about how our hedge fund — the one we told you all to invest in — is up 46% year to date; and now we find ourselves staring at an empty 401(k) with the same dumbfounded "what happened?" look on our face.

What is amazing about America circa 2008 is not the citizens' money illusion — history has seen that aplenty — but the utter lack of resistance to it. From near to far, from MTV to CNBC to cocktail parties, the doctrine of fiat money is so pervasive that the thought of life without it is beyond our comprehension. Maybe it shouldn't be.

Niall Ferguson recently asked why the West was so "blinded by money illusion." He asks the question as if we're over the illusion, as if we now see paper money for what it is. We don't. We, like the French of 1795, still blame "every cause except the right one" for our troubles.

On a Paris morning in February 1796, with great melancholy all the apparatus for printing paper money was "solemnly broken and burned" in that city's Place Vendome (p. 53). It took the French six years to figure it out; it's taken us 37 and counting.

Dr. White's excellent book can move us a step closer to "solemnly" breaking and burning the root of our problem. Even if it doesn't, Fiat Money Inflation in France is still a great read.

Notes

[1] Case in point: "All that saved thousands of laborers in France from starvation was that they were drafted off into the army and sent to be killed on foreign battlefields."

[2] Being French, they of course went on strike.

[3] My mother-in-law now lives with me. Her savings have been depleted by the dollar’s steady debasement. Thank you, Mr. Greenspan. You’re the best.