Thursday, October 2, 2008

Economic Depressions: Their Cause and Cure

Daily Article by | Posted on 10/2/2008

[This essay was originally published as a minibook by the Constitutional Alliance of Lansing, Michigan, 1969.]

We live in a world of euphemism. Undertakers have become "morticians," press agents are now "public relations counsellors" and janitors have all been transformed into "superintendents." In every walk of life, plain facts have been wrapped in cloudy camouflage.

No less has this been true of economics. In the old days, we used to suffer nearly periodic economic crises, the sudden onset of which was called a "panic," and the lingering trough period after the panic was called "depression."

The most famous depression in modern times, of course, was the one that began in a typical financial panic in 1929 and lasted until the advent of World War II. After the disaster of 1929, economists and politicians resolved that this must never happen again. The easiest way of succeeding at this resolve was, simply to define "depressions" out of existence. From that point on, America was to suffer no further depressions. For when the next sharp depression came along, in 1937–38, the economists simply refused to use the dread name, and came up with a new, much softer-sounding word: "recession." From that point on, we have been through quite a few recessions, but not a single depression.

But pretty soon the word "recession" also became too harsh for the delicate sensibilities of the American public. It now seems that we had our last recession in 1957–58. For since then, we have only had "downturns," or, even better, "slowdowns," or "sidewise movements." So be of good cheer; from now on, depressions and even recessions have been outlawed by the semantic fiat of economists; from now on, the worst that can possibly happen to us are "slowdowns." Such are the wonders of the "New Economics."

For 30 years, our nation's economists have adopted the view of the business cycle held by the late British economist, John Maynard Keynes, who created the Keynesian, or the "New," Economics in his book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, published in 1936. Beneath their diagrams, mathematics, and inchoate jargon, the attitude of Keynesians toward booms and bust is simplicity, even naivete, itself. If there is inflation, then the cause is supposed to be "excessive spending" on the part of the public; the alleged cure is for the government, the self-appointed stabilizer and regulator of the nation's economy, to step in and force people to spend less, "sopping up their excess purchasing power" through increased taxation. If there is a recession, on the other hand, this has been caused by insufficient private spending, and the cure now is for the government to increase its own spending, preferably through deficits, thereby adding to the nation's aggregate spending stream.

The idea that increased government spending or easy money is "good for business" and that budget cuts or harder money is "bad" permeates even the most conservative newspapers and magazines. These journals will also take for granted that it is the sacred task of the federal government to steer the economic system on the narrow road between the abysses of depression on the one hand and inflation on the other, for the free-market economy is supposed to be ever liable to succumb to one of these evils.

All current schools of economists have the same attitude. Note, for example, the viewpoint of Dr. Paul W. McCracken, the incoming chairman of President Nixon's Council of Economic Advisers. In an interview with the New York Times shortly after taking office [January 24, 1969], Dr. McCracken asserted that one of the major economic problems facing the new Administration is "how you cool down this inflationary economy without at the same time tripping off unacceptably high levels of unemployment. In other words, if the only thing we want to do is cool off the inflation, it could be done. But our social tolerances on unemployment are narrow." And again: "I think we have to feel our way along here. We don't really have much experience in trying to cool an economy in orderly fashion. We slammed on the brakes in 1957, but, of course, we got substantial slack in the economy."

Note the fundamental attitude of Dr. McCracken toward the economy — remarkable only in that it is shared by almost all economists of the present day. The economy is treated as a potentially workable, but always troublesome and recalcitrant patient, with a continual tendency to hive off into greater inflation or unemployment. The function of the government is to be the wise old manager and physician, ever watchful, ever tinkering to keep the economic patient in good working order. In any case, here the economic patient is clearly supposed to be the subject, and the government as "physician" the master.

It was not so long ago that this kind of attitude and policy was called "socialism"; but we live in a world of euphemism, and now we call it by far less harsh labels, such as "moderation" or "enlightened free enterprise." We live and learn.

What, then, are the causes of periodic depressions? Must we always remain agnostic about the causes of booms and busts? Is it really true that business cycles are rooted deep within the free-market economy, and that therefore some form of government planning is needed if we wish to keep the economy within some kind of stable bounds? Do booms and then busts just simply happen, or does one phase of the cycle flow logically from the other?

The currently fashionable attitude toward the business cycle stems, actually, from Karl Marx. Marx saw that, before the Industrial Revolution in approximately the late eighteenth century, there were no regularly recurring booms and depressions. There would be a sudden economic crisis whenever some king made war or confiscated the property of his subject; but there was no sign of the peculiarly modern phenomena of general and fairly regular swings in business fortunes, of expansions and contractions. Since these cycles also appeared on the scene at about the same time as modern industry, Marx concluded that business cycles were an inherent feature of the capitalist market economy. All the various current schools of economic thought, regardless of their other differences and the different causes that they attribute to the cycle, agree on this vital point: That these business cycles originate somewhere deep within the free-market economy. The market economy is to blame. Karl Marx believed that the periodic depressions would get worse and worse, until the masses would be moved to revolt and destroy the system, while the modern economists believe that the government can successfully stabilize depressions and the cycle. But all parties agree that the fault lies deep within the market economy and that if anything can save the day, it must be some form of massive government intervention.

There are, however, some critical problems in the assumption that the market economy is the culprit. For "general economic theory" teaches us that supply and demand always tend to be in equilibrium in the market and that therefore prices of products as well as of the factors that contribute to production are always tending toward some equilibrium point. Even though changes of data, which are always taking place, prevent equilibrium from ever being reached, there is nothing in the general theory of the market system that would account for regular and recurring boom-and-bust phases of the business cycle. Modern economists "solve" this problem by simply keeping their general price and market theory and their business cycle theory in separate, tightly-sealed compartments, with never the twain meeting, much less integrated with each other. Economists, unfortunately, have forgotten that there is only one economy and therefore only one integrated economic theory. Neither economic life nor the structure of theory can or should be in watertight compartments; our knowledge of the economy is either one integrated whole or it is nothing. Yet most economists are content to apply totally separate and, indeed, mutually exclusive, theories for general price analysis and for business cycles. They cannot be genuine economic scientists so long as they are content to keep operating in this primitive way.

But there are still graver problems with the currently fashionable approach. Economists also do not see one particularly critical problem because they do not bother to square their business cycle and general price theories: the peculiar breakdown of the entrepreneurial function at times of economic crisis and depression. In the market economy, one of the most vital functions of the businessman is to be an "entrepreneur," a man who invests in productive methods, who buys equipment and hires labor to produce something which he is not sure will reap him any return. In short, the entrepreneurial function is the function of forecasting the uncertain future. Before embarking on any investment or line of production, the entrepreneur, or "enterpriser," must estimate present and future costs and future revenues and therefore estimate whether and how much profits he will earn from the investment. If he forecasts well and significantly better than his business competitors, he will reap profits from his investment. The better his forecasting, the higher the profits he will earn. If, on the other hand, he is a poor forecaster and overestimates the demand for his product, he will suffer losses and pretty soon be forced out of the business.

The market economy, then, is a profit-and-loss economy, in which the acumen and ability of business entrepreneurs is gauged by the profits and losses they reap. The market economy, moreover, contains a built-in mechanism, a kind of natural selection, that ensures the survival and the flourishing of the superior forecaster and the weeding-out of the inferior ones. For the more profits reaped by the better forecasters, the greater become their business responsibilities, and the more they will have available to invest in the productive system. On the other hand, a few years of making losses will drive the poorer forecasters and entrepreneurs out of business altogether and push them into the ranks of salaried employees.

If, then, the market economy has a built-in natural selection mechanism for good entrepreneurs, this means that, generally, we would expect not many business firms to be making losses. And, in fact, if we look around at the economy on an average day or year, we will find that losses are not very widespread. But, in that case, the odd fact that needs explaining is this: How is it that, periodically, in times of the onset of recessions and especially in steep depressions, the business world suddenly experiences a massive cluster of severe losses? A moment arrives when business firms, previously highly astute entrepreneurs in their ability to make profits and avoid losses, suddenly and dismayingly find themselves, almost all of them, suffering severe and unaccountable losses? How come? Here is a momentous fact that any theory of depressions must explain. An explanation such as "underconsumption" — a drop in total consumer spending — is not sufficient, for one thing, because what needs to be explained is why businessmen, able to forecast all manner of previous economic changes and developments, proved themselves totally and catastrophically unable to forecast this alleged drop in consumer demand. Why this sudden failure in forecasting ability?

An adequate theory of depressions, then, must account for the tendency of the economy to move through successive booms and busts, showing no sign of settling into any sort of smoothly moving, or quietly progressive, approximation of an equilibrium situation. In particular, a theory of depression must account for the mammoth cluster of errors which appears swiftly and suddenly at a moment of economic crisis, and lingers through the depression period until recovery. And there is a third universal fact that a theory of the cycle must account for. Invariably, the booms and busts are much more intense and severe in the "capital goods industries" — the industries making machines and equipment, the ones producing industrial raw materials or constructing industrial plants — than in the industries making consumers' goods. Here is another fact of business cycle life that must be explained — and obviously can't be explained by such theories of depression as the popular underconsumption doctrine: That consumers aren't spending enough on consumer goods. For if insufficient spending is the culprit, then how is it that retail sales are the last and the least to fall in any depression, and that depression really hits such industries as machine tools, capital equipment, construction, and raw materials? Conversely, it is these industries that really take off in the inflationary boom phases of the business cycle, and not those businesses serving the consumer. An adequate theory of the business cycle, then, must also explain the far greater intensity of booms and busts in the non-consumer goods, or "producers' goods," industries.

Fortunately, a correct theory of depression and of the business cycle does exist, even though it is universally neglected in present-day economics. It, too, has a long tradition in economic thought. This theory began with the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher and economist David Hume, and with the eminent early nineteenth century English classical economist David Ricardo. Essentially, these theorists saw that another crucial institution had developed in the mid-eighteenth century, alongside the industrial system. This was the institution of banking, with its capacity to expand credit and the money supply (first, in the form of paper money, or bank notes, and later in the form of demand deposits, or checking accounts, that are instantly redeemable in cash at the banks). It was the operations of these commercial banks which, these economists saw, held the key to the mysterious recurrent cycles of expansion and contraction, of boom and bust, that had puzzled observers since the mid-eighteenth century.

The Ricardian analysis of the business cycle went something as follows: The natural moneys emerging as such on the world free market are useful commodities, generally gold and silver. If money were confined simply to these commodities, then the economy would work in the aggregate as it does in particular markets: A smooth adjustment of supply and demand, and therefore no cycles of boom and bust. But the injection of bank credit adds another crucial and disruptive element. For the banks expand credit and therefore bank money in the form of notes or deposits which are theoretically redeemable on demand in gold, but in practice clearly are not. For example, if a bank has 1000 ounces of gold in its vaults, and it issues instantly redeemable warehouse receipts for 2500 ounces of gold, then it clearly has issued 1500 ounces more than it can possibly redeem. But so long as there is no concerted "run" on the bank to cash in these receipts, its warehouse-receipts function on the market as equivalent to gold, and therefore the bank has been able to expand the money supply of the country by 1500 gold ounces.

The banks, then, happily begin to expand credit, for the more they expand credit the greater will be their profits. This results in the expansion of the money supply within a country, say England. As the supply of paper and bank money in England increases, the money incomes and expenditures of Englishmen rise, and the increased money bids up prices of English goods. The result is inflation and a boom within the country. But this inflationary boom, while it proceeds on its merry way, sows the seeds of its own demise. For as English money supply and incomes increase, Englishmen proceed to purchase more goods from abroad. Furthermore, as English prices go up, English goods begin to lose their competitiveness with the products of other countries which have not inflated, or have been inflating to a lesser degree. Englishmen begin to buy less at home and more abroad, while foreigners buy less in England and more at home; the result is a deficit in the English balance of payments, with English exports falling sharply behind imports. But if imports exceed exports, this means that money must flow out of England to foreign countries. And what money will this be? Surely not English bank notes or deposits, for Frenchmen or Germans or Italians have little or no interest in keeping their funds locked up in English banks. These foreigners will therefore take their bank notes and deposits and present them to the English banks for redemption in gold — and gold will be the type of money that will tend to flow persistently out of the country as the English inflation proceeds on its way. But this means that English bank credit money will be, more and more, pyramiding on top of a dwindling gold base in the English bank vaults. As the boom proceeds, our hypothetical bank will expand its warehouse receipts issued from, say 2500 ounces to 4000 ounces, while its gold base dwindles to, say, 800. As this process intensifies, the banks will eventually become frightened. For the banks, after all, are obligated to redeem their liabilities in cash, and their cash is flowing out rapidly as their liabilities pile up. Hence, the banks will eventually lose their nerve, stop their credit expansion, and in order to save themselves, contract their bank loans outstanding. Often, this retreat is precipitated by bankrupting runs on the banks touched off by the public, who had also been getting increasingly nervous about the ever more shaky condition of the nation's banks.

The bank contraction reverses the economic picture; contraction and bust follow boom. The banks pull in their horns, and businesses suffer as the pressure mounts for debt repayment and contraction. The fall in the supply of bank money, in turn, leads to a general fall in English prices. As money supply and incomes fall, and English prices collapse, English goods become relatively more attractive in terms of foreign products, and the balance of payments reverses itself, with exports exceeding imports. As gold flows into the country, and as bank money contracts on top of an expanding gold base, the condition of the banks becomes much sounder.

This, then, is the meaning of the depression phase of the business cycle. Note that it is a phase that comes out of, and inevitably comes out of, the preceding expansionary boom. It is the preceding inflation that makes the depression phase necessary. We can see, for example, that the depression is the process by which the market economy adjusts, throws off the excesses and distortions of the previous inflationary boom, and reestablishes a sound economic condition. The depression is the unpleasant but necessary reaction to the distortions and excesses of the previous boom.

Why, then, does the next cycle begin? Why do business cycles tend to be recurrent and continuous? Because when the banks have pretty well recovered, and are in a sounder condition, they are then in a confident position to proceed to their natural path of bank credit expansion, and the next boom proceeds on its way, sowing the seeds for the next inevitable bust.

But if banking is the cause of the business cycle, aren't the banks also a part of the private market economy, and can't we therefore say that the free market is still the culprit, if only in the banking segment of that free market? The answer is No, for the banks, for one thing, would never be able to expand credit in concert were it not for the intervention and encouragement of government. For if banks were truly competitive, any expansion of credit by one bank would quickly pile up the debts of that bank in its competitors, and its competitors would quickly call upon the expanding bank for redemption in cash. In short, a bank's rivals will call upon it for redemption in gold or cash in the same way as do foreigners, except that the process is much faster and would nip any incipient inflation in the bud before it got started. Banks can only expand comfortably in unison when a Central Bank exists, essentially a governmental bank, enjoying a monopoly of government business, and a privileged position imposed by government over the entire banking system. It is only when central banking got established that the banks were able to expand for any length of time and the familiar business cycle got underway in the modern world.

The central bank acquires its control over the banking system by such governmental measures as: Making its own liabilities legal tender for all debts and receivable in taxes; granting the central bank monopoly of the issue of bank notes, as contrasted to deposits (in England the Bank of England, the governmentally established central bank, had a legal monopoly of bank notes in the London area); or through the outright forcing of banks to use the central bank as their client for keeping their reserves of cash (as in the United States and its Federal Reserve System). Not that the banks complain about this intervention; for it is the establishment of central banking that makes long-term bank credit expansion possible, since the expansion of Central Bank notes provides added cash reserves for the entire banking system and permits all the commercial banks to expand their credit together. Central banking works like a cozy compulsory bank cartel to expand the banks' liabilities; and the banks are now able to expand on a larger base of cash in the form of central bank notes as well as gold.

So now we see, at last, that the business cycle is brought about, not by any mysterious failings of the free market economy, but quite the opposite: By systematic intervention by government in the market process. Government intervention brings about bank expansion and inflation, and, when the inflation comes to an end, the subsequent depression-adjustment comes into play.

The Ricardian theory of the business cycle grasped the essentials of a correct cycle theory: The recurrent nature of the phases of the cycle, depression as adjustment intervention in the market rather than from the free-market economy. But two problems were as yet unexplained: Why the sudden cluster of business error, the sudden failure of the entrepreneurial function, and why the vastly greater fluctuations in the producers' goods than in the consumers' goods industries? The Ricardian theory only explained movements in the price level, in general business; there was no hint of explanation of the vastly different reactions in the capital and consumers' goods industries.

The correct and fully developed theory of the business cycle was finally discovered and set forth by the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises, when he was a professor at the University of Vienna. Mises developed hints of his solution to the vital problem of the business cycle in his monumental Theory of Money and Credit, published in 1912, and still, nearly 60 years later, the best book on the theory of money and banking. Mises developed his cycle theory during the 1920s, and it was brought to the English-speaking world by Mises's leading follower, Friedrich A. von Hayek, who came from Vienna to teach at the London School of Economics in the early 1930s, and who published, in German and in English, two books which applied and elaborated the Mises cycle theory: Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, and Prices and Production. Since Mises and Hayek were Austrians, and also since they were in the tradition of the great nineteenth-century Austrian economists, this theory has become known in the literature as the "Austrian" (or the "monetary over-investment") theory of the business cycle.

Building on the Ricardians, on general "Austrian" theory, and on his own creative genius, Mises developed the following theory of the business cycle:

Without bank credit expansion, supply and demand tend to be equilibrated through the free price system, and no cumulative booms or busts can then develop. But then government through its central bank stimulates bank credit expansion by expanding central bank liabilities and therefore the cash reserves of all the nation's commercial banks. The banks then proceed to expand credit and hence the nation's money supply in the form of check deposits. As the Ricardians saw, this expansion of bank money drives up the prices of goods and hence causes inflation. But, Mises showed, it does something else, and something even more sinister. Bank credit expansion, by pouring new loan funds into the business world, artificially lowers the rate of interest in the economy below its free market level.

On the free and unhampered market, the interest rate is determined purely by the "time-preferences" of all the individuals that make up the market economy. For the essence of a loan is that a "present good" (money which can be used at present) is being exchanged for a "future good" (an IOU which can only be used at some point in the future). Since people always prefer money right now to the present prospect of getting the same amount of money some time in the future, the present good always commands a premium in the market over the future. This premium is the interest rate, and its height will vary according to the degree to which people prefer the present to the future, i.e., the degree of their time-preferences.

People's time-preferences also determine the extent to which people will save and invest, as compared to how much they will consume. If people's time-preferences should fall, i.e., if their degree of preference for present over future falls, then people will tend to consume less now and save and invest more; at the same time, and for the same reason, the rate of interest, the rate of time-discount, will also fall. Economic growth comes about largely as the result of falling rates of time-preference, which lead to an increase in the proportion of saving and investment to consumption, and also to a falling rate of interest.

But what happens when the rate of interest falls, not because of lower time-preferences and higher savings, but from government interference that promotes the expansion of bank credit? In other words, if the rate of interest falls artificially, due to intervention, rather than naturally, as a result of changes in the valuations and preferences of the consuming public?

What happens is trouble. For businessmen, seeing the rate of interest fall, react as they always would and must to such a change of market signals: They invest more in capital and producers' goods. Investments, particularly in lengthy and time-consuming projects, which previously looked unprofitable now seem profitable, because of the fall of the interest charge. In short, businessmen react as they would react if savings had genuinely increased: They expand their investment in durable equipment, in capital goods, in industrial raw material, in construction as compared to their direct production of consumer goods.

Businesses, in short, happily borrow the newly expanded bank money that is coming to them at cheaper rates; they use the money to invest in capital goods, and eventually this money gets paid out in higher rents to land, and higher wages to workers in the capital goods industries. The increased business demand bids up labor costs, but businesses think they can pay these higher costs because they have been fooled by the government-and-bank intervention in the loan market and its decisively important tampering with the interest-rate signal of the marketplace.

The problem comes as soon as the workers and landlords — largely the former, since most gross business income is paid out in wages — begin to spend the new bank money that they have received in the form of higher wages. For the time-preferences of the public have not really gotten lower; the public doesn't want to save more than it has. So the workers set about to consume most of their new income, in short to reestablish the old consumer/saving proportions. This means that they redirect the spending back to the consumer goods industries, and they don't save and invest enough to buy the newly-produced machines, capital equipment, industrial raw materials, etc. This all reveals itself as a sudden sharp and continuing depression in the producers' goods industries. Once the consumers reestablished their desired consumption/investment proportions, it is thus revealed that business had invested too much in capital goods and had underinvested in consumer goods. Business had been seduced by the governmental tampering and artificial lowering of the rate of interest, and acted as if more savings were available to invest than were really there. As soon as the new bank money filtered through the system and the consumers reestablished their old proportions, it became clear that there were not enough savings to buy all the producers' goods, and that business had misinvested the limited savings available. Business had overinvested in capital goods and underinvested in consumer products.

The inflationary boom thus leads to distortions of the pricing and production system. Prices of labor and raw materials in the capital goods industries had been bid up during the boom too high to be profitable once the consumers reassert their old consumption/investment preferences. The "depression" is then seen as the necessary and healthy phase by which the market economy sloughs off and liquidates the unsound, uneconomic investments of the boom, and reestablishes those proportions between consumption and investment that are truly desired by the consumers. The depression is the painful but necessary process by which the free market sloughs off the excesses and errors of the boom and reestablishes the market economy in its function of efficient service to the mass of consumers. Since prices of factors of production have been bid too high in the boom, this means that prices of labor and goods in these capital goods industries must be allowed to fall until proper market relations are resumed.

Since the workers receive the increased money in the form of higher wages fairly rapidly, how is it that booms can go on for years without having their unsound investments revealed, their errors due to tampering with market signals become evident, and the depression-adjustment process begins its work? The answer is that booms would be very short lived if the bank credit expansion and subsequent pushing of the rate of interest below the free market level were a one-shot affair. But the point is that the credit expansion is not one-shot; it proceeds on and on, never giving consumers the chance to reestablish their preferred proportions of consumption and saving, never allowing the rise in costs in the capital goods industries to catch up to the inflationary rise in prices. Like the repeated doping of a horse, the boom is kept on its way and ahead of its inevitable comeuppance, by repeated doses of the stimulant of bank credit. It is only when bank credit expansion must finally stop, either because the banks are getting into a shaky condition or because the public begins to balk at the continuing inflation, that retribution finally catches up with the boom. As soon as credit expansion stops, then the piper must be paid, and the inevitable readjustments liquidate the unsound over-investments of the boom, with the reassertion of a greater proportionate emphasis on consumers' goods production.

Thus, the Misesian theory of the business cycle accounts for all of our puzzles: The repeated and recurrent nature of the cycle, the massive cluster of entrepreneurial error, the far greater intensity of the boom and bust in the producers' goods industries.

Mises, then, pinpoints the blame for the cycle on inflationary bank credit expansion propelled by the intervention of government and its central bank. What does Mises say should be done, say by government, once the depression arrives? What is the governmental role in the cure of depression? In the first place, government must cease inflating as soon as possible. It is true that this will, inevitably, bring the inflationary boom abruptly to an end, and commence the inevitable recession or depression. But the longer the government waits for this, the worse the necessary readjustments will have to be. The sooner the depression-readjustment is gotten over with, the better. This means, also, that the government must never try to prop up unsound business situations; it must never bail out or lend money to business firms in trouble. Doing this will simply prolong the agony and convert a sharp and quick depression phase into a lingering and chronic disease. The government must never try to prop up wage rates or prices of producers' goods; doing so will prolong and delay indefinitely the completion of the depression-adjustment process; it will cause indefinite and prolonged depression and mass unemployment in the vital capital goods industries. The government must not try to inflate again, in order to get out of the depression. For even if this reinflation succeeds, it will only sow greater trouble later on. The government must do nothing to encourage consumption, and it must not increase its own expenditures, for this will further increase the social consumption/investment ratio. In fact, cutting the government budget will improve the ratio. What the economy needs is not more consumption spending but more saving, in order to validate some of the excessive investments of the boom.

Thus, what the government should do, according to the Misesian analysis of the depression, is absolutely nothing. It should, from the point of view of economic health and ending the depression as quickly as possible, maintain a strict hands off, "laissez-faire" policy. Anything it does will delay and obstruct the adjustment process of the market; the less it does, the more rapidly will the market adjustment process do its work, and sound economic recovery ensue.

The Misesian prescription is thus the exact opposite of the Keynesian: It is for the government to keep absolute hands off the economy and to confine itself to stopping its own inflation and to cutting its own budget.

It has today been completely forgotten, even among economists, that the Misesian explanation and analysis of the depression gained great headway precisely during the Great Depression of the 1930s — the very depression that is always held up to advocates of the free market economy as the greatest single and catastrophic failure of laissez-faire capitalism. It was no such thing. 1929 was made inevitable by the vast bank credit expansion throughout the Western world during the 1920s: A policy deliberately adopted by the Western governments, and most importantly by the Federal Reserve System in the United States. It was made possible by the failure of the Western world to return to a genuine gold standard after World War I, and thus allowing more room for inflationary policies by government. Everyone now thinks of President Coolidge as a believer in laissez-faire and an unhampered market economy; he was not, and tragically, nowhere less so than in the field of money and credit. Unfortunately, the sins and errors of the Coolidge intervention were laid to the door of a non-existent free market economy.

If Coolidge made 1929 inevitable, it was President Hoover who prolonged and deepened the depression, transforming it from a typically sharp but swiftly-disappearing depression into a lingering and near-fatal malady, a malady "cured" only by the holocaust of World War II. Hoover, not Franklin Roosevelt, was the founder of the policy of the "New Deal": essentially the massive use of the State to do exactly what Misesian theory would most warn against — to prop up wage rates above their free-market levels, prop up prices, inflate credit, and lend money to shaky business positions. Roosevelt only advanced, to a greater degree, what Hoover had pioneered. The result for the first time in American history, was a nearly perpetual depression and nearly permanent mass unemployment. The Coolidge crisis had become the unprecedentedly prolonged Hoover-Roosevelt depression.

Ludwig von Mises had predicted the depression during the heyday of the great boom of the 1920s — a time, just like today, when economists and politicians, armed with a "new economics" of perpetual inflation, and with new "tools" provided by the Federal Reserve System, proclaimed a perpetual "New Era" of permanent prosperity guaranteed by our wise economic doctors in Washington. Ludwig von Mises, alone armed with a correct theory of the business cycle, was one of the very few economists to predict the Great Depression, and hence the economic world was forced to listen to him with respect. F. A. Hayek spread the word in England, and the younger English economists were all, in the early 1930s, beginning to adopt the Misesian cycle theory for their analysis of the depression — and also to adopt, of course, the strictly free-market policy prescription that flowed with this theory. Unfortunately, economists have now adopted the historical notion of Lord Keynes: That no "classical economists" had a theory of the business cycle until Keynes came along in 1936. There was a theory of the depression; it was the classical economic tradition; its prescription was strict hard money and laissez-faire; and it was rapidly being adopted, in England and even in the United States, as the accepted theory of the business cycle. (A particular irony is that the major "Austrian" proponent in the United States in the early and mid-1930s was none other than Professor Alvin Hansen, very soon to make his mark as the outstanding Keynesian disciple in this country.)

What swamped the growing acceptance of Misesian cycle theory was simply the "Keynesian Revolution" — the amazing sweep that Keynesian theory made of the economic world shortly after the publication of the General Theory in 1936. It is not that Misesian theory was refuted successfully; it was just forgotten in the rush to climb on the suddenly fashionable Keynesian bandwagon. Some of the leading adherents of the Mises theory — who clearly knew better — succumbed to the newly established winds of doctrine, and won leading American university posts as a consequence.

But now the once arch-Keynesian London Economist has recently proclaimed that "Keynes is Dead." After over a decade of facing trenchant theoretical critiques and refutation by stubborn economic facts, the Keynesians are now in general and massive retreat. Once again, the money supply and bank credit are being grudgingly acknowledged to play a leading role in the cycle. The time is ripe — for a rediscovery, a renaissance, of the Mises theory of the business cycle. It can come none too soon; if it ever does, the whole concept of a Council of Economic Advisors would be swept away, and we would see a massive retreat of government from the economic sphere. But for all this to happen, the world of economics, and the public at large, must be made aware of the existence of an explanation of the business cycle that has lain neglected on the shelf for all too many tragic years.

Monday, September 29, 2008

The Government's $700 Billion Screw Up

The Rescue Package Will Delay Recovery
Daily Article by Posted on 9/29/2008

In his testimony to the Congress on September 24, Fed Chairman Bernanke urged the legislators to quickly approve the bailout of the financial sector with a package of $700 billion. Bernanke echoed Treasury Secretary Paulson's view that the bailout expense, while hefty, is needed to remove from banks' balance sheets the mortgage-linked assets, which are paralyzing the flow of credit.

I think it's extraordinarily important to understand that as we have seen many previous examples in different countries and in different times that choking up of credit is like taking the lifeblood away from the economy.

Most experts came out in strong support for the package. Without the rescue package, many large institutions that are "too big to fail" could go belly up. Many believe that the consequences of all this could be very severe to the real economy.

It is true that the financial system must be rescued; it must be rescued from the institutions holding bad debt that are currently draining capital while waiting for a bailout and adding little in return. It is they that are preventing wealth-generating activities in the financial sector and the other parts of the economy from expanding real wealth.

The Essence of Economic Adjustment

Conventional thinking presents economic adjustment — also labeled as "economic recession" — as something terrible, even the end of the world. In fact, economic adjustment is not menacing or terrible; from an economic point of view, it is nothing more than a time when scarce resources are reallocated in accordance with consumers' priorities.

Allowing the market to do the allocation always leads to better results. Even the founder of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lenin, understood this when he introduced the market mechanism for a brief period in March 1921 to restore the supply of goods and prevent economic catastrophe. Yet for some strange reason, most experts these days cling to the view that the market cannot be trusted in difficult times like these.

If central bankers and government bureaucrats can fix things in difficult times, why not in good times too? Why not have a fully controlled economy and all the problems will be fixed forever? The collapse of the Soviet Union's centralized system is the best testimony one can have that controls don't work. A better way to fix economic problems is to allow entrepreneurs the freedom to allocate resources in accordance with society's priorities.

In this sense, the best rescue plan is to allow the market mechanism to operate freely. Allowing the market to do the job will result in some activities disappearing all together while some other activities will in fact be expanded.

Take, for instance, a company that has six profitable activities and four losing activities. The management of the company concludes that the four losing activities must go. To keep them alive is a threat to the survival of the company; these activities rob scarce funding from profitable activities.

Once the losing activities are shut down, the released funding can now be employed to strengthen the winning activities. The management can also decide to use some of the released funding to acquire some other profitable activities.

This is precisely what the government rescue package prevents from happening. The government package is not going to rescue the economy, but it will rescue activities that the economy cannot afford and that consumers do not want. It will sustain waste and promote inefficiency, draining resources from growth and efficiency. Remember: government is not a wealth generator; it can only take resources from A and give them to B.

Can the Rescue Package Prevent Economic Disruptions?

Some supporters of the package are of the view that the package is necessary in order to prevent economic disruptions. They mean by this that various phony activities should be kept alive by wealth generators for a little bit longer until a proper system is established. By "proper," they mean more controls.

For a while, the government's package can appear to be working; this is because there is still enough real savings to support both profitable and unprofitable activities. If, however, savings and capital are shrinking, nothing is going to help, and the real economy will follow up with further declines.

Hence the rescue package cannot prevent so-called economic disruptions. If anything, government intervention would make these disruptions much worse. Again, a better alternative is to let the market do the job. The market's ability to make swift adjustments without much drama was vividly illustrated only a few weeks ago when the very large investment bank, Lehman Brothers, was allowed to go belly up. The world did not come to an end. Instead, this was a healthy development. A money loser was eliminated from the market. This freed up resources to promote growth.

One could have made the case that when Lehman was on the brink it was too big to fail — assets of $639 billion and employing over 26,000 people. Yet in a few days the market, once allowed to do the job, reallocated the good pieces of Lehman to various buyers and the bad parts have vanished. It was poetry.

Likewise Merrill Lynch, which was bought by the Bank of America, will see the good parts of it reinforced while the useless parts are likely to be removed.

On September 18, 2008, Washington Mutual, the largest US saving and loan bank, was forced into liquidation. The bank had $307 billion in assets and $188 billion in deposits. What prompted the closure are heavy losses on its $227 billion book of real-estate loans, of which a large portion was in subprime mortgages.

The bank lost $6.3 billion in the nine months ending June 30. Against this background, and coupled with customers withdrawing $16.7 billion over the past ten days, government regulators decided to close the bank.

Observe that this was the largest US banking failure. Note that the closure of the bank didn't result in the end of the world. JP Morgan Chase bought some of the good assets of Washington Mutual for $1.9 billion.

On this, Jeffrey Tucker made the following observation,

But as wonderful as the daily shifts and movements are, what really inspires are the massive acts of creative destruction such as when old-line firms like Lehman and Merrill melt before our eyes, their good assets transferred to more competent hands.… This is the kind of shock and awe we should all celebrate. It is contrary to the wish of all the principal players and it accords with the will of society as a whole and the dictate of the market that waste not last and last. No matter how large, how entrenched, how exalted the institution, it is always vulnerable to being blown away by market forces — no more or less so than the lemonade stand down the street.

Most commentators have accepted that the root problem of the current financial crisis is the lack of proper control over mortgage lending. But the out-of-proportion explosion in the mortgage lending didn't occur out of the blue. Without the aggressive lowering of interest rates by the Fed, mortgage lending couldn't have exploded. The Fed lowered the federal-funds rate target from 6% in January 2001 to 1% by June 2003. The 1% was kept until June 2004.

The loose monetary stance prepared the ground for various false activities that wouldn't have been around without the loose stance. If authorities had kept strong controls over mortgage lending, while at the same time creating money out of thin air, the excesses would have popped up in some other sector. The banks would have ended up having plenty of bad non-mortgage-related assets.

The Fed's loose policies are the crux of the problem. So rather than blaming the symptoms, what is required is to let the market work and close all the loopholes that allow the creation of money and credit out of thin air.

Can Making Banks' Balance Sheets Look Good "Fix" the Economy?

Recall that Treasurer Paulson and the Fed chairman are of the view that once banks' bad assets are removed, the banks are likely to move ahead and start lending. We suggest that making the balance sheet look pretty is not going to alter the essence of the problem, which is the poor state of capital and savings to support such high lending activities.

The essence of a sound credit market is not lending money as such but lending the real stuff that people require by means of money. Without the real stuff — the preceding savings and subsequent productivity to fund the lending — no lending is possible.

Decades of nonproductive consumption (consumption that is not backed up by production) that emerged on the back of loose monetary and fiscal policies have severely damaged the store of wealth that serves as the foundation for credit markets. If this is the case, it will be futile to try to boost lending by pushing more money into the banking system. More money cannot generate real wealth. If it could, world poverty would have been eliminated a long time ago.

When the market is allowed to take charge, the relationship between savings, lending, and productivity will be brought into proper perspective. At last we will know which activities are genuine and which are phony.

Does the Fall in Stock Prices Cause an Economic Slump?

The proponents of government intervention maintain that one cannot allow the market to take charge since this will cause a drop in stock prices, which will be bad for the economy. Within the confines of this way of thinking, it is not surprising that Bernanke and Paulson panicked on September 18, once a large money-market mutual fund — the Reserve Primary Fund — was on the brink.

They argue that were it not for the Fed's injecting $105 billion and the subsequent announcement of the rescue package, the stock market would have had a massive fall. They also believe that the massive monetary injection prevented a run on money-market mutual funds and prevented a major disaster.

They further believe that if people had taken the money out of their money-market mutual funds, banks wouldn't be able to secure money to fund credit cards and various consumer and business loans. This in turn would have paralyzed the economy.

So let us think about this. Say that people take their money from the money-market mutual funds. What happens then? They will have placed it somewhere else, mostly likely with commercial banks. Hence money wouldn't disappear and banks could continue to fund activities as before.

If large money-market funds were to go under, some of their assets would be sold and the shareholders would suffer losses; this however, cannot provide justification for the Fed to pump money and to introduce a rescue package. Monetary expansion and a rescue package do not undo the bad investment decisions of the money-market-mutual-fund managers. Why should people who didn't risk investments in the fund pick up the tab?

A fall in asset prices, including stocks, and a run on financial institutions are just symptoms and not the cause of anything. The key factor behind the current difficulty in the credit markets is the lagged effect coming from the Fed's tighter stance between June 2004 and August 2007, when the federal-funds-rate target was raised from 1% to 5.25%.

The tighter stance started to undermine various bubble activities that had emerged from the previous loose stance. A tighter stance slowed the diversion of real savings from wealth generators towards bubble activities. Without an adequate supply of real funding, these activities started to crumble. Obviously, then, banks that have been providing support to these activities by providing loans have ended up holding a large amount of bad assets.

As a result, bank stock prices started to come under pressure. With a time lag, bubbles in the various other parts of the economy are also likely to come under pressure, and this again is going to hurt financial stocks. So the fall in economic activity is not the result of a fall in stock prices, but rather comes on account of the tighter Fed stance that throttled the supply of real savings to non-wealth-generating activities.

Would the stock market have come under pressure if the Fed had kept the interest rate at 1% for an indefinite period of time? A prolonged loose stance would have given rise to a much greater amount of nonproductive bubble activities. As a result, the pace of real wealth generation would have continued to slow, and consequently the growth momentum of profits would have come under pressure. In response to this, commercial banks would have become more cautious in their expansion of credit out of thin air.

All this in turn would have undermined the existence of bubble activities. Bubble activities cannot stand on their own feet; once the rate of growth of the money supply slows down, the pace of the diversion of real savings towards false activities follows suit. As a result, the survival of these activities is threatened.

From this we can infer that a fall in non-wealth-generating activities — also labeled an economic slump — is not due to a fall in the stock market as such but to the previous loose monetary policy that has weakened the pool of real savings.

The central-bank policies aimed at preventing a fall in the stock market cannot prevent a fall in the real economy. In fact, the real economy has already been damaged by the previous loose monetary stance. All that the fall in the stock market does is inform us about the true state of economic conditions. The fall in the price of stocks just puts things in a proper perspective. The fall in the stock price is just an acknowledgment of reality.

Conclusion

Only a few weeks ago, we saw that the liquidation of a large bank such as Lehman Brothers and the sale of Merrill Lynch did not cause massive disruptions. In fact, the adjustment was swift and almost invisible. The reason for the smooth adjustment is that the market was allowed to do its job. If government and Fed bureaucrats had tried to intervene with bailouts, the whole process would have taken much longer and would have been very costly in terms of real resources.

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Frank Shostak is an adjunct scholar of the Mises Institute and a frequent contributor to Mises.org. He is chief economist of M.F. Global. Comment on the blog.
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Monday, July 28, 2008

Star Trek and Collectivism: The Case of the Borg, By Steven Yates

The Freeman: Ideas on Liberty - April 1997
Vol. 47 No. 4
Features:
Star Trek and Collectivism: The Case of the Borg
By Steven Yates

Does the American flag belong in church?

Does the American flag belong in church?
Our allegiance belongs to God, not state power.
By Becky Akers

America vs Canada

War Plan Red: America's 1920's Plan to Attack Canada, and Canada's 1921 Plan for a Pre-emptive Attack Against America.

ANWR Drilling Would Provide Quick Relief, by Robert P. Murphy

Daily Article by | Posted on 7/28/2008

In a previous article, I showed that the proposals to curb "excessive" speculation in oil futures markets were based on ignorance of how the market coordinates production and consumption over time. In the present article, I will explore the issue of opening up the Arctic National Wilderness Refuge (ANWR) to oil drilling. We'll see once again that even friends of the market often don't fully understand its power to fix problems.

The Standard Argument Over ANWR

With record oil prices, many on the Right (as defined with today's labels) have understandably called for the federal government to remove its restrictions on oil exploration and drilling in ANWR (located in Alaska) as well as other federal lands and offshore water areas.[1] They point out that these federal restrictions, in conjunction with local environmental activism, have resulted in the absurd situation where 94 percent of federal land, and 97 percent of federal offshore waters, are not being leased by energy companies. The US government itself estimates that its own prohibitions currently render 18 billion barrels in the outer continental shelf (OCS) and 19 billion barrels located under federal lands off limits. Note that these are very conservative estimates, because nobody has gone out and extensively explored the areas where it is illegal to extract oil!

Of course, calls to open up domestic areas for drilling horrify environmentalists and others on the Left, who liken the move to giving a junkie one more fix rather than dealing with his addiction. One of their strongest arguments is that ANWR drilling isn't a real solution for today's crisis, since

The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that it will require 8 to 10 years after opening ANWR before oil is produced from any new leases. Furthermore, it would be 20 years after opening ANWR before oil production reached its peak of only 780,000 barrels per day.http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/truth_about_americas_energy.pdf

Faced with this response, the people on the Right have typically come back with a few zingers. First, they point out that the critics of drilling have provided alternative proposals (development of renewable energy, conservation measures such as raising CAFE standards, etc.) that would also take years to kick in. They also frequently mention that this ten-year lag would have been over by now, if President Clinton hadn't vetoed the attempt to open up ANWR back in 1995.http://www.gop.com/media/PDFs/42806DemEnergy.pdf

More Oil in the Future Means More Oil Now

Yet there is an even stronger argument for opening up ANWR: because of its impact on oil prices in the future, relaxing federal prohibitions would cause current oil producers to change their pumping decisions right now. Even though the additional barrels from ANWR wouldn't physically hit the market for years, current knowledge of this fact will alter current behavior, leading to rapid relief at the pump.

Though compelling, this argument is subtle and has only recently gained attention. I myself didn't bat an eye when experts in the industry told me (last year at a briefing) that opening ANWR wasn't a near-term solution. It wasn't until a colleague passed along an unpublished paper by Coats and Pecquet that I considered the impact of future supply increases on current production decisions.

Once I heard the argument, it was obvious and I couldn't believe I had missed it. I began using it wherever I could, and was very glad to see that the respected Martin Feldstein made the case in the Wall Street Journal. Hopefully, proponents of ANWR drilling will now feel confident to repeat the claim. In the remaining space, I'll spell out the argument as simply as possible, because, admittedly, at first it sounds too good to be true.

Prices Guide Production

Imagine that you are sitting on a huge oil deposit, which has (let us suppose) one billion barrels that can be brought to the surface for $20 each, so long as you don't pump more than one million barrels per day. (If you want to pump at a higher rate, you have to spend more money per barrel, and you might reduce the total number of barrels you can extract from the deposit.) So the question is, how fast should you pump?

You might at first think that you should pump at the maximum extraction rate, without raising your marginal costs — i.e., that you should pump at one million bbls/day. But this clearly is wrong, if you expect oil prices to keep rising. Why sell 365 million barrels in 2008 at an average of $150 each, when you could postpone production for a year and then sell those same million barrels for, say, $200 each?

In light of this consideration, maybe you think you should just hold your barrels off the market forever. By letting them sit in the ground, the market value of your asset rises over time, as the market price of oil rises.

But that isn't necessarily the right thing to do, either. What if oil prices rise an average of only 10 percent per year over the next two decades? Do you really want to put all your eggs (oil) in one basket, by leaving them sitting underground? Especially if your deposit is located in the Middle East, you might feel more comfortable selling off some of the oil now, and then using the revenue to buy stocks and bonds, not to mention a few surface-to-air missile silos. (And of course, you could be wrong in your forecasts; maybe oil prices will tank in two years.)

My point here isn't to come up with the "optimal" extraction plan for an oil producer; since I'm not in the business, there are undoubtedly considerations I would overlook. But what I will say is that the expected price of oil in the future plays a very important role in these decisions. As always, a liquid futures market allows oil producers (and consumers) to make much more confident plans, because they can lock in prices for future transactions. For example, the oil producer doesn't have to simply guess that he can postpone production today, in order to sell next year at $150 per barrel; he can sell futures contracts to make sure of it (assuming he can find a buyer at that price).

Now what happens if we are at an initial equilibrium, and then all of a sudden the US government relaxes the prohibitions on ANWR drilling? If oil traders really believe the policy shift is permanent, and that up to a million extra barrels will be hitting the market in a decade, then this will obviously reduce the expected world price of oil starting at that time. Consequently, any oil producers who had previously settled on a production rate with "excess capacity" — i.e., where they could have produced and sold more barrels today, but decided not to for reasons of profit — will re-evaluate their decision.

Without specifics we have no idea how much the new information will change their output plans, but surely they will pump more in the present than they had previously decided.

If we step back and survey the big picture, what would happen is that the market in a sense would be transferring some of those future ANWR barrels to the present. It's true, the market doesn't have recourse to time machines. But physical barrels of oil that would have otherwise sat underground in 2008, 2009, and so on, will now be brought to the surface and sold, because they have been displaced by the barrels currently buried in Alaska that will be brought to the surface and sold in 2018, 2019, and so on.

If this seems too theoretical and farfetched, consider this: In May, the Saudis officially rebuffed President Bush's request for them to increase their output. Yet one month later, they reversed their position. What changed in the interim?

http://www.mises.org/store/Politically-Incorrect-Guide-to-Capitalism-The-P360C0.aspx
Obviously I don't know for sure what motivates oil barons, but the political mood in the United States shifted in between those two announcements. All of a sudden, opening up ANWR and offshore areas for drilling was "on the table." The mere possibility of an extra million or more competing barrels per day may have been enough to reverse the Saudis' stance.

Conclusion

Market prices help coordinate actions over space and time. To the extent that it is physically possible, the market will exploit the availability of new future supplies in order to provide immediate relief. The time lag involved should be no deterrent to opening up ANWR (and other prohibited areas) for oil development.

Beyond that, the ideal solution would be to completely privatize federal lands, so that the decision of whether or not to drill would no longer be a political one.

[VIEW THIS ARTICLE ONLINE]

Saturday, July 19, 2008

Speculators Are in Obama's Sights

The Freeman: Ideas on Liberty - August 1999
Vol. 49 No. 8

Columns:

Conservation and Speculation
By Dwight R. Lee


Dwight Lee is Ramsey Professor at the Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, and an adjunct fellow at the Center for Study of American Business at Washington University.

I often ask my students, “How many of you are in favor of conservation?” Except for those who are asleep, every hand goes up. I then ask, “How many of you are in favor of speculators?” and almost no one raises his hand. The students see conservation as a noble activity that prevents people from squandering resources now to insure that adequate quantities will be available in the future. On the other hand, they see speculation as the greedy hoarding of valuable resources now in order to gouge those who will need those resources later. I attempt to explain that if they are serious about conservation, they should also applaud speculation. The speculation that results from private property and the desire for profits is the most powerful force for beneficial conservation.

The Right Amount of Conservation

Without private property rights there could be no speculation for personal profit and no meaningful conservation. As discussed last month, animal species that are not privately owned are the ones at risk of extinction. Without private property no one has an incentive to conserve a resource, since no one can benefit from doing so. But if I own a resource and believe its value is going to be greater in the future (after considering the cost of holding it—including the opportunity cost of forgoing interest), I will conserve it for future use or sale. Similarly, even if I don’t own a resource, but I believe its value is going to increase, I will buy it at today’s price in order to conserve (hoard) it and then sell it at the expected higher price later.

But why should we depend on private property and greed to conserve valuable resources? Why not have the government determine how much of a resource should be conserved and then limit its current use accordingly? Relying on government to enforce conservation would be foolish even if the right amount of conservation were known. If government has enough power to allocate a resource over time, it has enough power to allocate its use to competing alternatives at each point in time. This much power guarantees waste, as special-interest influence replaces the cooperation of market exchange in determining how and where resources are used.

But even if the public interest, rather than special interests, motivated government decisions (dream on), the authorities could never determine the right amount of conservation as accurately as speculators subject to the discipline of the marketplace. There can be too much as well as too little conservation. Just as we don’t want to use resources today that will be worth a lot more in the future, neither do we want to sacrifice consumption today to conserve resources that will be worth less in the future.

Speculators Do It Better

Even if government authorities were not subject to special-interest influence, they would have less motivation to conserve wisely than speculators do. If bureaucrats make wasteful decisions, their salaries aren’t reduced. Indeed, their failures often result in larger budgets, supposedly so they can do a better job. In sharp contrast, speculators make money only if they conserve wisely—purchasing resources (holding them off the market) when they are less valuable and selling them (making them available) when they are more valuable. If speculators don’t conserve enough they pass up profitable opportunities to buy low and sell high, and if they conserve too much they lose money by buying high and selling low. As opposed to bureaucrats, who can survive despite their mistakes, the speculator who consistently makes mistakes is soon relieved of the money necessary to continue speculating.

Speculators can also act much more quickly than any government agency. For example, at the first indication that next year’s Brazilian coffee crop will be devastated by a frost, speculators will immediately purchase raw coffee beans to store them until next year. Consumers will still see plenty of ground coffee in the stores, but suddenly the prices will be higher. What consumers don’t see is that coffee prices will be lower next year than they otherwise would have been because they are higher today, and that their reduced consumption today will be more than compensated by their greater consumption later. The complaint will be that greedy speculators have unnecessarily driven up prices. Interestingly, the universal complaint against speculators that they cause current prices to be too high is really a complaint that they conserve too much.

Don’t Complain Out Loud

I find it fascinating that people who believe that speculators are responsible for prices being too high complain about it out loud. The last thing you should do if you are convinced that speculators are harming the public by driving up the prices of important resources is to let others know. If you are correct, you can make yourself a fortune by keeping quiet, while providing a valuable public service at the same time. If the public is being harmed by speculative buying, it is because coffee is being taken off the market now when it is worth more than it will be later. If this is so, you would be right to criticize speculators for harmful price increases.

But this is a problem you can help correct. Simply call your broker and sell coffee short. Selling short means borrowing a quantity of coffee (from a speculator) and selling it at the currently high price. When the price falls later, you can buy the quantity borrowed, repay the speculator, and pocket the difference between the two prices. (You will have sold high and bought low.) If you were correct about market conditions, you will have made the coffee available to consumers now and made a profit. Why you should keep your criticism of speculators secret is obvious. If others believe you, they will sell coffee short themselves, which will drive down the current price and increase the future price, thereby reducing your profit opportunities.

Too Important to Leave to the “Experts”

Why don’t we hear fewer people complaining about speculators and see more people selling short? The answer has to be that most people find complaining easier than understanding what they are complaining about. But the objective here is not to criticize. The important point is that anyone who believes he has better information on the future value of resources or commodities than is reflected in market prices can both profit personally and benefit society by acting on that information—if he is right. So when conservation is left to speculators, far more relevant information from far more people with far more at stake is acted on than if conservation is left to government.

Conservation is important, much too important to leave to government “experts.” There is no better way of achieving sensible conservation than through the concern for the future that is motivated by private property, market exchange, and speculators putting their own money on the line.


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©2007 Foundation for Economic Education. All Rights Reserved.
http://www.fee.org/Publications/the-Freeman/article.asp?aid=4692

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